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Abstract
A lack of corporate governance and financial reporting may lead to a decrease in
profitability and bank closures due to poor management, lack of capital, and liquidity.
Based on agency theory, the purpose of this correlational study was to investigate the
relationship between corporate governance, financial reporting, and three measures of
profitability; return on assets, return on equity, and net interest margin, in 80 banks
within the Midwest from 2015–2018. The data were collected from the banks' websites
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The results of the three
regression analyses were not significant; however, financial reporting was a more
substantial contributor ( = -.122) than corporate governance ( = -.021) for return on
equity, so bank leaders should monitor and maintain robust financial reporting systems.
The implications for positive social change include the potential to build confidence
amongst investors, managers, employees, and board members. Banking leaders with
accurate banking information and sound corporate governance may improve community
banking, leading to increased investors, strategic assumption of risk, and community
economic and job growth.
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Section 1: Foundation of the Study
Several international leaders have been apprised of or involved in famous
financial scandals. These leaders include Bernie Madoff of Bernard L. Madoff
Investment Securities, Kenneth Lay of Enron, John Sidgmore of WorldCom, Mark
Vorsatz of Arthur Anderson, Xerox, Maxwell, and Allied Irish Bank (Agrawal & Cooper,
2017). These financial scandals resulted in a drop in the stock market, and several
employees lost their jobs and lost their financial security. Investors also lost their
investments, and the amount of tax collected decreased (Agrawal & Cooper, 2017). One
common cause of these failures was a weak internal control system, which resulted from
poor corporate governance (Awolowo, Garrow, Clark, & Chan, 2018).
The auditors' failure to reveal any discrepancies in the financial statements
decreased investor's confidence in the financial records and became a huge factor in the
accounting scandals (Ahmed, 2016). After the financial scandals, investors had a
significant amount of doubt regarding the stock market, policymakers, and the reliability
of professional accountants and auditors of (Isik & Folkinshteyn, 2017). Since the
financial scandals were so high-profile, they have led to a debate on corporate
governance's effectiveness as a strategy to improve financial reporting and protect
investors (Anginer, Demirguc-Kunt, Huizinga, & Ma, 2016).
Business ethics and corporate governance rules and regulations have been at the
forefront of investor's minds due to corporate mismanagement (Lemma & Negash, 2016).
The recent financial scandals have justified the importance of new rules and regulations
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to regulate corporate governance within organizations (Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016).
Legislators and regulators seek to strengthen and enhance corporate governance rules and
regulations, disclosure, and transparency to prevent future financial crises (Al-Maghzom,
Hussainey, & Aly, 2016). One example of the rules and regulations put into place to
prevent financial crises is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) enacted by the U.S.
Congress to impose corporate governance rules and regulations on publicly listed
companies (Sorensen & Miller, 2017). SOX addressed audit independence, board
independence, and corporate disclosures (Silkoset, Nygaard, & Kidwell, 2016).
The United States passed SOX in 2002, which changed the accounting profession
standards (Sorensen & Miller, 2017). SOX had many vital provisions that companies
needed to follow. The purpose of the requirements was to improve the independence of
the external auditors and strengthen corporate governance and board of directors
(Silkoset et al., 2016). Banking is a highly regulated industry, and corporate governance
is a critical element to maintain transparent financial reporting (Sorensen & Miller,
2017). The regulation behind corporate governance continues to evolve; bank managers
and board of directors can demonstrate the changes to investors by showing them the
financial disclosures (Silkoset et al., 2016).
Background of the Problem
The purpose of corporate governance is to achieve long-term stockholder value;
as the banking leaders adopt the best practices in corporate governance, the bank may
achieve better financial performance and a better market for the bank (Al-Matari, Al-
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Swidi, & Fadzil, 2014; Ghazali, 2010; Mazzotta & Veltri, 2014). Corporate governance is
a valuable tool to mitigate the conflicts of interest between stakeholders and management
(Al-Matari & Al-Arussi, 2016; Pandya, 2011). Corporate governance is a crucial piece to
market stability and economic development, shown through research (Bonna, 2011;
Chahine & Safieddine, 2011).
Corporate governance is crucial to protect the interest of all the stakeholders and
shareholders. Corporate governance induces confidence not only from the stakeholders
and shareholders but also (a) government, (b) employees, (c) suppliers, and (d)
customers. Companies with weaker corporate governance have higher input costs, lower
labor productivity, lower equity returns, lower value, and lower operating performance
than banks with good corporate governance (Zaharia & Zaharia, 2012). Shareholders can
see economic growth and an increase in wealth due to good corporate governance (Cretu,
2012).
In this study, I investigated the relationship between corporate governance,
financial reporting, and profitability to see if strong corporate governance and financial
reporting increased profitability. This study's focus was on corporate governance
mechanisms in different levels of corporate governance and financial performance and
market value by examining the relationship between corporate governance, financial
reporting, and profitability. The findings of this study can be generalized to other regional
banks.
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Problem Statement
Small banks often fail because they do not have effective corporate governance
and financial reporting in place (Lin & Chang, 2016). A bank's lack of effective corporate
governance and financial reporting can lead to 76% of them failing within the first 5
years (Mustaghfiroh, 2016). Between 2008 and 2012, the United States closed 465 banks
because of poor management, liquidity, and capital (Isik & Folkinshteyn, 2017). The
general business problem is a lack of effective corporate governance and financial
reporting within the banking institutions, which leads to a decrease in profitability. The
specific business problem is how corporate governance and financial reporting in
regional banks correlate with regional banking profitability.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the
relationship between corporate banking governance, banking financial reporting, and
regional bank's profitability by using the return on asset (ROA), the return of equity
(ROE), and net interest margin (NIM). The independent variables were three mechanisms
of corporate governance and financial reporting: (a) mature program, (b) new program,
and (c) no program. Before comparing the three variables, each variable was evaluated
independently for a more thorough strategic analysis. The three dependent variables,
ROA, ROE, NIM, measured profitability from 2015 through 2018. The target population
consisted of executive leadership in regional banks located in the Midwest United States.
This study can lead to positive social change by equipping owners with information on
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strategies that can provide new ways to reconfigure corporate governance and financial
reporting, promoting operational efficiency and an economic contribution to state and
local economies.
Nature of the Study
I chose a quantitative methodology for this study. In a quantitative study, the
researcher looks at the data and the relationship between the variables and the research
because the quantitative method studies things in their natural settings (Saunders, Lewis,
& Thornhill, 2016) to solve for a predefined hypothesis (Cox, 2012). My goal for this
study was to examine the relationship between governance and reporting on profitability
through quantitative analytical procedures; therefore, the quantitative method was
appropriate. In qualitative research, investigators focus on the broad business problem
(Saunders et al., 2016). The qualitative method is used by researchers to collect the data
and make adaptions to the research based on the unanticipated responses from
participants (Saunders et al., 2016). The mixed-method research design is the
combination of quantitative and qualitative research techniques that are used to address
more complicated research questions and develops a deeper theoretical understanding
(Saunders et al., 2016). The qualitative and mixed-method research design have some
flexibility in the research; however, in this study, I used quantitative analytics. Therefore,
neither qualitative nor mixed methods were appropriate.
I chose the correlational design for this study. Three research designs were
considered: (a) correlational, (b) experimental, and (c) quasi-experimental. Correlational
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design is used to examine the relationship between two or more variables (Carus &
Ogilvie, 2009). Experimental quantitative research design is used to examine the cause
and effect relationship between variables using the scientific method (Cokley & Awad,
2013). The quasi-experimental design is also used to examine the cause and effect
relationship between the variables, but the researcher did not assign groups (Cokley &
Awad, 2013). In this study, I used a correlational study allowed to investigate the study
variable (Yilmaz, 2013). I used statistics and charting techniques to evaluate the
numerical data to determine the variables' relationship. I recognized any trends showing a
relationship between the variables (Carus & Ogilvie, 2009). The study was a
monomethod quantitative design using secondary data as the single-data collection
method. I provide a probable ranking of corporate governance, financial reporting, and
the impact on profitability.
Research Question
For this study, the central research question was:
Research Question (RQ): What relationship exists between corporate governance,
financial reporting, and banking institution profitability?
Hypotheses
Null Hypothesis (H1.0): There was no statistically significant relationship between
corporate governance, financial reporting and ROA as the dependent
within banking institutions?
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Alternative Hypothesis (H1.A): There was a statistically significant relationship
between corporate governance, financial reporting, and ROA as the
dependent variable within banking institutions?
Null Hypothesis (H2.0): There was no statistically significant relationship between
the independent variables of corporate governance and financial reporting
and ROE as the dependent variable within banking institutions?
Alternative Hypothesis (H2.A): There was a statistically significant relationship
between the independent variables of corporate governance and financial
reporting and ROE as the dependent variable within banking institutions?
Null Hypothesis (H3.0): There was no statistically significant relationship between
the independent variables of corporate governance and financial reporting
and NIM as the dependent variable within banking institutions?
Alternative Hypothesis (H3.A): There was a statistically significant relationship
between the independent variables of corporate governance and financial
reporting and NIM as the dependent variable within banking institutions?
Theoretical Framework
The agency theory framework was the appropriate lens for my study. Agency
theory links to corporate governance by acting as a monitoring tool for management
(L'Huillier, 2014). I used the agency theory approach to look at the variables from an
independent perspective. Tumbat and Grayson (2016) described agency theory as the
approach that explained the relationship between agents and principals.
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An agency theory study by Feils, Rahman, and Sabac (2018) identified how
national corporate governance constraints affected a bank's performance. Cohen, Manion,
and Morrison (2017) looked at how small banks' implementation of corporate governance
affected their profitability by using agency theory as the theoretical framework.
Furthermore, the relationship between corporate governance, financial reporting, and
profitability in small banks identified by scholars through previous research. For instance,
one item identified by the scholars was the proportion to which corporate governance's
effectiveness can either increase or decrease the bank's profitability. Within agency
theory, reporting and profitability were the foundational concerns of banking.
Operational Definitions
The following definitions are key terms within this study:
Corporate governance: The system of internal controls and procedures that
regional banks follow. Corporate governance provides a framework that identifies
managers' roles and responsibilities, the board of directors, and shareholders
(Awotundun, Kehinde, & Somoye, 2011).
Financial reporting: Financial results of a company that shares with the public.
The financial statements can show the financial health of the company (Adiloglu &
Vuran, 2012). The financial statements include the income statement, balance sheet, and
cash flow statement, which show the footnotes from the accountants, which describe
more detail about the company's framework.
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Mature program: Regional banks had corporate governance in place for more
than ten years (Bonna, 2011).
Net interest margin (NIM): This measures the regional banks' investments to their
debt (Ionescu, 2012). NIM is calculated by subtracting interest expenses from interest
income then dividing by the average earning assets.
New program: Regional banks only had corporate governance in place for less
than ten years (Bonna, 2011).
No program: Regional banks that either do not have any corporate governance or
have ineffective corporate governance in place (Bonna, 2011).
Profitability: The banks' ability to show financial gain or profit (Yeh, 2017).
Regional banks: They are more extensive than community banks, and they offer
more services and serve a specific geographical region (Yeh, 2017). Regional banks serve
a specific geographic region and have at least $1 billion in assets (Al-Matari & Al-Arussi,
2016).
Return on assets (ROA): A ratio that shows how profitable a company is based on
how effective the company is at using its assets. The formula to find ROA is to divide the
net income by total assets (Adiloglu & Vuran, 2012).
Return on equity (ROE): A ratio that shows investors the return on their
investment. ROE's formula is the net income divided by the average total equity
(Adiloglu & Vuran, 2012).
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Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations
Assumptions are beliefs considered to be accurate but that cannot be verified
(Starbuck, 2014). Researchers make assumptions about theories under investigation, the
methodology, the instrument for data collection, method of analysis, the sample, and the
results (Starbuck, 2014). Limitations refer to potential study weaknesses. Limitations are
areas that the researcher cannot control or address (Brutus, Aguinis, & Wassmer, 2013).
Delimitations refer to the bounds of the scope of the study (Starbuck, 2014). The
delimitations relate to theories, practices, and business problems within a study
(Starbuck, 2014).
Assumptions
My first assumption was that excluding banks that do not have corporate
governance or financial reports available does not affect the results. My second
assumption was that the secondary archival data obtained was accurate, reliable, and
honest information. My third assumption was that banks' profitability had no relationship
to their corporate governance mechanisms in place.
Limitations
The study contained some potential limitations. The first inherent limitation of
this study was the use of secondary data that were not initially intended for this study.
The secondary data could potentially contain errors, which could have affected the
findings of regional banks within the study. To overcome this limitation, it was essential
to use various sources for data such as (a) banks' websites, (b) annual reports, and (c)
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Moody's analytics. Data triangulation minimized limitations by using various data
sources instead of just one source (Bonna, 2011).
The second limitation related to the measurement variables. Corporate governance
is considered a framework indicator. I considered financial reporting an economic
indicator that did not concern profitability. Academic researchers disagree on corporate
governance and financial reporting indicators affecting profitability (Bonna, 2011).
The third limitation was the focus of the study. I focused on the internal process
of a bank instead of external factors. External factors can have a significant effect on
financial performance, just like internal factors. The macroeconomy, microeconomy, and
inflation can all have a substantial impact on financial performance. If the findings of this
study are compared to previous or future research by scholars, it is important to note any
economic issues that could affect the results.
Delimitations
My goal for this study was to investigate the relationship between corporate
governance, financial reporting, and profitability. My focus was on regional banks for the
years 2015–2018. I only examined the regional banks with corporate governance and
financial data available throughout the study period. The variables of corporate
governance and financial reporting were limited to: (a) mature program, (b) new
program, and (c) no program. ROA, ROE, and NIM represented profitability.
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Significance of the Study
Corporate governance is essential for rural banks because accounting standards,
regulations, legislation, and economic theories are not effective in mitigating conflicts
between the board of directors and shareholders (Rouf, 2012). Furthermore, corporate
governance can enhance the bank's financial performance and market value when
publicly listed (Bonna, 2011). The effectiveness and efficiency of corporate governance
systems can be different in mature and new programs in rural banks. The differences are
the other corporate governance structures within rural banking that result in various
economic and social conditions (Zaharia & Zaharia, 2012). Accordingly, the result of
implementing corporate governance between mature and new programs is different. The
benefits gained from corporate governance depend on the length of corporate governance
implementation and the structure (Ionescu, 2012).
Contribution to Business Practice
In this study, I focused on explaining the relationship between corporate
governance, financial reporting, and profitability in rural banks. Based on this study's
vigorous procedures, the results may be generalized to other banks in the Midwest.
Corporate governance and financial reporting affect the banks' strategic decisions in
investing in the bank's resources. Shareholder wealth is a goal of many rural banks. There
is often a direct positive relationship among corporate governance, financial reporting,
and shareholder wealth (Rouf, 2012). When the bank managers try to increase
shareholders' wealth, managers try to increase the bank's profits (Mazzotta & Veltri,
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2014). General corporate governance practices and policies can play a crucial role in
improving financial performance (Zaharia & Zaharia, 2012).
Furthermore, the banks' managers can use the study's findings to reduce
investment risks and improve investor confidence in their performance. Bank managers
can differentiate between the different types of banks and send reliable signals to attract
investors by adopting acceptable corporate governance policies and practices. Bank
managers may reduce the capital cost and enhance the banks' market value and reputation
and raise funds necessary for the operation and expansion when improving the banks'
corporate governance practices (Ionescu, 2012). Based on this study's findings, the
concerned parties of corporate governance and financial reporting can build a thriving
corporate governance model that maximizes the companies' profits and protects
shareholder rights.
Implications for Social Change
At the community or society level, rural bank leaders and regulators can benefit
from the study's findings to fight embezzlement, encourage more investments, and
develop capital markets. The protection for shareholders and other stakeholders' interests
is essential for creating maximum benefits for the citizens (Ararat, Black, & Yurtoglu,
2017). Bank leaders can use the study's findings to build corporate governance models,
protect stakeholders' rights, reduce bankruptcies, and increase profits. Furthermore,
promoting and implementing good corporate governance and financial reporting and
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utilizing the study's findings can affect rural banking profitability, leading to economic
growth.
A Review of the Professional and Academic Literature
With the increase in demand for corporate governance rules and regulations,
business leaders need to address the economic and social effects. The academic literature
on corporate governance has continued to increase in the last decade. The purpose of this
literature review is to provide an overview of all past and present relevant studies that
addressed the importance of corporate governance and its relationship to financial
reporting and profitability. In the review, I focused on research that supports the research
question, hypothesis, and theoretical framework of my study.
Literature Search Strategy
I used the following databases to conduct the literature review: Business Source
Premier, Academic Source Premier, ABI/INFORM, EBSCO, and ProQuest Central.
Related books were also collected through the college library. The search engines that I
used were Google, Google Scholar, and Bing. The strategy was focused on peer-reviewed
journal articles relevant to the study published within 5 years of expected CAO approval
of the completed study. I collected references that support this study using several
different methods. The strategy I used also included the identification of important
concepts, keywords, and other relevant information.
I used the following key terms and a combination of search terms and phrases to
find the literature: corporate governance, financial reporting of banks, the profitability of
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banks, agency theory, and corporate governance. Other relevant terms included financial
reporting and profitability in banks, ineffective corporate governance, researcher bias,
and regional banks. Terms used in the search related to the methodology included
quantitative study, secondary data, Tabachnick and Fidell's formula, and regression
analysis.
I limited the search to peer-reviewed journals published within the last 5 years to
provide recent articles on corporate governance implementation in regional banks. I used
articles older than 5 years for seminal work sparingly when needed. Journal articles were
ran through Ulrich's periodicals Directory to confirm they were peer-reviewed (Tallent,
2000). I also searched regulatory institution websites like Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the National
Credit Union Administration (NCUA) to obtain documents on corporate governance
implementation within the banking industry. I used published books and research
methods that were relevant to quantitative research in corporate governance.
The review of the professional and academic literature headings are organized
into four principal headings: (a) corporate governance theories, (b) the concepts and
definitions of corporate governance, (c) corporate governance and financial reporting in
regional banks, and (d) corporate governance mechanisms. This study contains 128
references, of which 105 recommendations were published within 5 years of expected
CAO approval of the completed research. I used peer-reviewed journal articles which
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equal 100% of the total study's recommendations. The search terms I used frequently
include: (a) corporate governance, (b) corporate governance mechanisms, (c) corporate
governance theories, (d) financial performance, (e) profitability, and (f) regional banks.
Corporate Governance Theories
In this section, the foundational theory on corporate governance and other
relevant theories, for understanding and how they related to corporate governance.
Researchers have developed several approaches that highlight the regional banks' key
objectives and how the banks meet their obligations and responsibilities towards
stakeholders. Corporate governance began from agency theory, and through the emerging
problems and issues, other theories such as stakeholder theory, stewardship theory,
institutional theory, and resource dependency theory have developed (Githinji-Muriithi,
2017). In this study, the discussion of corporate governance theories included the five
fundamental theories that affected the development of corporate governance: agency
theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship theory, institutional theory, and resource
dependency theory.

Foundational theory/agency theory. The proponents of agency theory use a type
of agreement that connects owners and stakeholders in a principal-agent relationship. As
per this agreement, managers have one objective: to satisfy the interests of the owners.
Consequently, any variation from this agreement results in an agency problem (Carney,
Gedajlovic, & Sur, 2011). The owners in corporations or banks are also the shareholders.
Furthermore, the agency problem arises when the well-being of the agent relies on the
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principal. An agency problem occurs when management sets goals that conflict with the
purposes of the owners.
Since the agent acts on behalf of the principal, the principal is affected by the
agent's actions. An executive can pursue their interests even if they do not reflect the
interests of the shareholders. Executives often have information about the company, and
they can exploit company resources to increase their profit, which can lower the owner's
profits (Seal, 2006).
Researchers find ways to minimize any potential conflicts between managers and
shareholders (Ajili & Bouri, 2018). The conflict needs to be resolved between managers
and shareholders and between any internal and external shareholders. When the conflict
is minimized, the company performance and shareholder profits increase (Akhidime,
2019). In many cases, the conflict between managers and shareholders results from a lack
of corporate governance mechanisms. Corporate governance mechanisms need to be in
place to ensure effective and efficient control while also allowing approval and
sanctioning management decisions that minimize agency conflict (Al-Maghzom et al.,
2016).
Even though agents act on behalf of the principal, it is important to monitor
corporate governance mechanisms continuously. Monitoring the mechanisms ensures that
the potential conflicts between agents and principals are mitigated (Al-Maghzom et al.,
2016). Company performance and market value can be enhanced by reducing agency
problems. A reduction in agency problems occurs when there is a continuous oversight
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over management. The board of directors is essential to maintain oversight over
management and ensure management is working in the shareholders' best interests.
Corporate governance mechanisms are essential to maintaining supervision because it
monitors management behavior and protects the shareholder's and ensures the interests
between the two are aligned (Ali, 2018).
Advocates of agency theory identified several corporate governance mechanisms
that help minimize conflicts of interests between the agent and principal. One corporate
governance mechanism includes incentives to reward executives financially when they
maximize stakeholder's profit. Some of the most typical incentives include bonuses and
stock options, focusing on the company's long-term value maximization and stakeholder
profit (Bebchuk & Hirst, 2019). Continuing to monitor the incentives and rewards helps
align stakeholders' interests with the rewards of management (Bebchuk & Hirst, 2019).
Hence, the shareholders choose individuals to represent them on the board of directors to
ensure capital is applied to the intended purpose (Callaghan, 2019).
Agency costs are incurred by stakeholders (principals) when they reduce the
failings of management and the board by hiring external auditors (Carney et al., 2011).
On the other hand, owners incur agency costs when they have to overcome the
opportunistic activities of management (Al-Matari & Al-Arussi, 2016). Therefore, agency
costs occur when there is a misalignment between owners and managers and their
interests (Callaghan, 2019). When there is an alignment between the objectives of
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management (agent) and shareholders (principals), then the agency cost is lowered
(Carney et al., 2011).
Other Relevant Theories
In this section, a few different theories were reviewed to understand and relate to
corporate governance. The other relevant theories include stakeholder theory,
stewardship theory, institutional theory, and resource dependency theory. Each theory has
been applied to corporate governance in research, but agency theory is a better fit for this
study.

Stakeholder theory. Stakeholders have become prevalent amongst management,
boards, and media because they are affected by or can affect the company achieving their
objectives. Stakeholders often include shareholders, suppliers, customers, employees,
lenders, governments, and various other groups. Stakeholder theory can balance the
interests of stakeholders and the company. Proponents of stakeholder theory encourage
management to implement methodologies that allow the company to achieve its objective
while keeping everyone satisfied (John, DeMasi, & Paci, 2016). The company's financial
values the result of parties that come together, manage, collaborate, and then create a plan
to enhance everyone's positions (Anginer et al., 2016).
While the definition of stakeholder theory varies by scholar, one common theme
is that stakeholders are a group that is vital to the success and survival of the bank
(Hendry, 2001). This definition encompasses the social system but is also oriented in
companies. As a stakeholder, it is important to know how the firm's survival impacts
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them directly or indirectly (Feils et al., 2018). Stakeholders own the company, and the
managers must perform in the stakeholder's best interest.
Stakeholder theory combines many components: law, ethics, and economics.
Supporters of stakeholder theory expand management's responsibility to encompass
corporate social responsibility, profit maximization, and business morality (Till & Yount,
2019). Stakeholder theory is useful when developing and maintaining relationships with
stakeholders because it discloses the information to ensure a good relationship between
managers and stakeholders is maintained. This reduces agency problems, but many
supporters do not feel that the information should be disclosed. Under stakeholder theory,
management has more significant resources that allow them to identify and remedy
internal problems (Feils et al., 2018). Transparency in financial information is important
for investors; therefore, this information should be disclosed to ease investors' fears, and
for this reason, agency theory is a better fit for this study.

Stewardship theory. Another theory that is common in corporate governance is
the stewardship theory. Stewardship theory assumes that management aspires to high
objectives by creating high levels of responsibility and achievement while still protecting
the company's best interest (Samaha & Khlif, 2016). Stewardship theory originated in
sociology and psychology (Yeong, Ismail, Ismail, & Hamzah, 2018). Under the
stewardship theory, management acts altruistically for the firms' benefit and the owners
(Dekker, 2016).
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Advocates of stewardship theory presume that management's primary focus is to
maximize company performance and market value, creating more benefits for the steward
and principal (Liu, Luo, Huang, & Yang, 2017). Warren, Moffitt, and Byrnes (2015)
defined management as a steward who works for the principal. Furthermore, the
stewardship theory is defined as an act or behavior that looks at both the firm and its
owners (Janvrin & Watson, 2017). However, management does play a role in stewardship
theory because they align their benefits with the firm's objectives. In stewardship theory,
management focuses on protecting the principals and increase profits (Silva, Quelhas,
Gomes, & Domingos, 2017). In agency theory, however, managers work for their selfinterests.
Ahmadi Simab and Shams Koloukhi (2018) acknowledged that under stewardship
theory principals give management the tools necessary to empower them to perform in
the best interests. Agency theory can cause mistrust between agents and principals. Still,
the principals need to build a trusting relationship with the stewards to avoid a monitored
and controlled structure. One of the main distinguishing features of stewardship theory is
replacing a lack of trust (Martin, Farndale, Paauwe, & Stiles, 2016). When management
has full authority, they can make independent decisions that are best for the company
(Delaney, McManus, & Lamminmaki, 2016).
Under agency theory, however, the board of directors' effectiveness is
accomplished by the separation of the CEO and chairman positions. However, in
stewardship theory, CEO duality can be a good corporate governance practice that results
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in positive financial performance. Since the authority chain is integrated and unified, the
company can make faster decisions, leading to an increase in financial performance
(Ghasemi, Mohamad, Karami, Bajuri, & Asgharizade, 2016). When the interests of the
CEO and principals are aligned then the CEOs look at the interests of all shareholders
and make decisions for their benefits (Drum, Pernsteiner, & Revak, 2016). Companies
that have CEO duality are able to achieve faster, healthier, and more efficient decisions.
This is due to the fact that the CEOs are trustworthy and good stewards of the bank's
assets and resources (Rausch & Wall, 2015). Furthermore, there is no difficulty in
management's motivations because the goal of steward is to outperform other companies
(Rausch & Wall, 2015).

Institutional theory. Institutional theory is another lens through which
researchers view corporate governance. Proponents of institutional theory focuses on the
transactions between agents and the firm and the uncertainties involved (Krenn, 2016;
Vadasi, Bekiaris, & Andrikopoulos, 2020; Zulfikar, Lukvianrman, & Suhardjanto, 2017).
The role of banks in the economy is to eliminate uncertainty by reducing both
information and transaction costs. When proper structure in banks is established then it
facilitates interactions between firms. Interaction between firms gives each company an
equal opportunity for an active role in an institutional environment. Krenn (2016) defined
the institutional environment as a set of legal, social, economic, and political conventions
that generate the initial source for creating products, services, and trade. Institutional
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theory has a robust external environment that influences companies in a transitional
economy (Krenn, 2016).
Banks are not just a place where cash transactions happen and cannot survive
without financial legitimacy (Vadasi et al., 2020). Institutional theory is most effective in
environments with high levels of legislation. In these environments, corporate
governance is considered an arrangement where investors expect an adequate return on
their investment. One component of institutional theory is the openness of bank practices
and human behavior. Thus, social culture becomes an integral part of the institutional
theory (Zulfikar et al., 2017).

Resource dependency theory. Pfeffer (1972) developed the resource dependency
theory; the foundation of this theory is that companies rely on each other to get the
required resources which creates a relationship between the companies (Ali, 2018). An
interlocking directorship and social relationship is created between the multiple
businesses. An interlocking directorship is when one person is a member of the board of
more than one business which allows them to achieve directorship. This benefits both
companies because the member brings experience and expertise to both companies.
Utilizing the strengths and experiences of management and the board of directors from
each company positively affects the strategic decision making of each company
(Madhani, 2017). Furthermore, this theory sees advantages and motivations to linking
businesses together with outside companies (Madhani, 2017). The linkages not only
create an open dialogue to companies but also creates a good relationship among
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shareholders. Having a good relationship with shareholders leads to an increase in value
for companies and helps make shareholders feel more comfortable (Inya, Psaros, &
Seamer, 2018).
Influential companies are able to control and monitor the external environments
and influence social issues compared to smaller firms. Companies that are able to control
and influence these issues are in a better position to solve tough social issues while
maintaining the confidence of the shareholders (Silva et al., 2017). Under the resource
dependency theory boards that have a large connection to external factors are able to
access valuable resources such as raising capital, improving corporate governance, and
making better strategic decisions (Korpi & Clark, 2017).
One factor in resource dependency theory is the board of directors' role in
accessing required resources (Mece, 2018). Both the stakeholder theory and resource
dependency theory focus on the participation of the board members in the decisions about
control and management of the company (Mece, 2018; Silva et al., 2017). Academic
scholars, however, have criticized both theories. Scholars disliked resource dependency
theory because it does not focus on the decision making and internal process.
Furthermore, the stewardship theory is blamed for the lack of details about the board of
directors' activities (Madhani, 2017). The agency theory involves the board, managers,
and shareholders and ensures managers are working in the company's best interests and
shareholders.
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In summary, corporate governance theories have been used throughout the
research to identify and develop best practices and corporate governance (Bebchuk &
Hirst, 2019). Even with these different theories, there is not one all-encompassing theory
for corporate governance that works every time. However, there is not one specific theory
that may work. Still, frequently a combination of one or more approaches can provide the
business alignment between the interests of principal and management (Ajili & Bouri,
2018). In this study, agency theory was the most appropriate choice because the
principal-agent relationship can be very significant when used appropriately.
The Concepts and Definitions of Corporate Governance
Corporate governance has become prevalent in the last decade. Within the last
decade, more companies have seen the importance of corporate governance and have
begun implementing it. Corporate governance is not only discussed in financial literature
but also academic literature. The discussion includes corporate governance, including
company ownership structure, economic efficiency, product competition, the
international context, and general qualities (Awolowo et al., 2018). Agency conflict
between stakeholders and managers leads to corporate governance issues. Even having
the most efficient contract does not eliminate the conflict of interest between two parties
(Ali, 2018). Corporate governance is a tool used by companies to solve potential conflicts
of interest. Through the implementation of corporate governance, leaders can implement
the strategic goals and objectives of the company. Corporate governance allows
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companies to decrease the operational risk of the company by using adequate internal and
external controls (Akhidime, 2019).
Corporate governance comprises the rules, regulations, and mechanisms adopted
by the company to ensure management does not have a conflict of interest with
customers, suppliers, stakeholders, society, employees, managers, and executive directors
of the company (Akhidime, 2019). Corporate governance allows companies to increase
profits and also reduce agency conflict. Corporate governance practices are directly
related to company performance and investor confidence and protection (Akhidime,
2019). The quality of corporate governance is contingent upon the regulatory framework
(Ararat et al., 2017). Corporate governance practices rely on company practices and
federal practices (Awolowo et al., 2018).
Effective corporate governance can prevent scheming by shareholders and
misconduct by management, reducing the risk for small investors. Companies that do not
have misconduct or scheming by management, and shareholders tend to have higher
quality corporate governance. Regulatory authorities enhance corporate governance rules,
regulations, and practices, which are a substantial piece of strengthening and improving
the basis for the company's long-term and short-term economic performance. There are
two main categories of corporate governance: the insider system and the outsider system.
Stakeholders in the insider system can have a conflict of interest between weak and
substantial shareholders. However, the outsider system can have a conflict of interest
between managers and detached shareholders (Ararat et al., 2017). There are two main
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corporate governance goals integrity of management and guidance to maximize
shareholders (Akhidime, 2019).
Companies that have sound corporate governance also have many benefits. One
benefit of structured corporate governance is that it can increase the bank, city, and state's
reputation. Capital markets are also increased due to structured corporate governance,
which ensures the distribution of resources in a more efficient manner (Bonna, 2011). A
potential crisis is eliminated while still guaranteeing the prosperity of the community.
From a bank's perspective, to have effective corporate governance, managers need
to decrease capital cost while increasing liquidity and financing opportunities.
Maintaining good corporate governance allows a company to overcome any potential
conflicts swiftly. Banks that continue to have efficient corporate governance tend to be
more successful than other companies (Drum et al., 2016). Investors tend to be willing to
pay a higher price for shares when a company has well-organized corporate governance
(Al-Maghzom et al., 2016). Corporate financial performances can be improved by having
effective corporate governance. Effective corporate governance can help solve conflicts
of interest between the bank and stakeholders (Krenn, 2016). Effective corporate
governance is effective based on the rules and structure of board of directors, managers,
and shareholders (Isik & Folkinshteyn, 2017).
While government regulation can be useful, there is a chance of overregulating
corporate governance. If the government overregulates corporate governance, companies
may not see economic and corporate stability. Some other problems with the
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overregulation of corporate governance are that companies may have poor performance
and a decline in the stock market value. Overregulation of corporate governance can
increase corporate governance while limiting managerial initiatives, leading to negative
performances (Douissa & Azrak, 2017; Inya et al., 2018).

Corporate governance concepts. To better understand corporate governance in
regional banks, it is essential to understand the concept of corporate governance.
Corporate governance equally distributes the power between three main groups: the
board of directors, managers, and shareholders. Dividing up the power ensures that
management decisions do not conflict with the interests of the shareholders (Isik &
Folkinshteyn, 2017). Managers need to continually work in the best interests of the
shareholders and the company while avoiding the potential to do what is best for
themselves. One apprehension of corporate governance is managing the relationship
between the board of directors, managers, and shareholders.
Corporate governance has both narrow and broad concepts (Callahan & Soileau,
2017; Chan & Kogan, 2016). The narrow corporate governance concepts identify the
relationships between shareholders, the board of directors, managers, auditors, and others
(Chan & Kogan, 2016). However, the broad concept is how the company maintains
honesty and openness, which is essential for the efficiency of capital allocation, market
confidence, and development of the companies (Callahan & Soileau, 2017). Both the
narrow and broad concepts work together to efficiently and effectively allocates company
resources (Chan & Kogan, 2016).
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The restraint approach and the large approach are two essential approaches to
corporate governance. A restraint approach helps achieve the owner's interests by
defining the totality and economic means (Hendry, 2001). The types of investors in any
company can play a significant part in the orientation and implementation of robust
corporate governance. In a broader perspective, corporate governance represents the
mechanisms and norms applied to complement and protect the shareholder's interests
(Agrawal & Cooper, 2017). The corporate governance philosophy depends on the
transparency and disclosures that improve shareholder's trust for a company. Corporate
social responsibility trends creating a business that accepts the ethical principles and
standards (Korpi & Clark, 2017). Hence, stakeholder's rights are protected and allow
companies to focus on financial and operational performance.

Corporate governance definitions. There is not a universal corporate
governance concept within regional banks in the United States. Additionally, researchers
and scholars utilize different organizational governance definitions, instrumentations, and
guides depending on the research (Marsidi, Annuar, & Rahman, 2017; Wilbanks,
Hermanson, & Sharma, 2017). Therefore, several different definitions have been used to
measure corporate governance.
However, the descriptions of corporate governance can generally be classified
into two categories. The first category identifies financial structures, growth, efficiency,
performance, and behavioral relationship with shareholders (Zainuldin, Lui, & Yii,
2018). The financial structures look at the behavior patterns of banks based on
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contemporary research. The second category of definitions look at the framework of
corporate governance and the rules and regulations that govern, control, and supervise
company activity (Garcia-Sánchez & Garcia-Meca, 2018; Selmier, 2016). The second
category looks more at the normative framework of corporate governance, also based on
contemporary research. Even though the two categories are different, there are some
overlapping ideas. For this study, several definitions were discussed, mainly the ones that
were consistent with agency theory.
Corporate governance is a system of rules, practices, and processes that a firm
uses to balance the company's stakeholders, senior management, executives, employees,
and communities (Tarchouna, Jarraya, & Bouri, 2017). However, Selmier (2016) defined
corporate governance as the framework of rules that the board of directors uses to ensure
the company operates transparently while maintaining fairness. Garcia-Sánchez and
Garcia-Meca (2018) identified several fundamental corporate governance principles that
are apparent regardless of the company definition of corporate governance.
Accountability, integrity, transparency, and responsibility are the basic principles that
several researchers use to interpret corporate governance. Since there is no standard
definition of corporate governance among researchers, management scholars define
corporate governance concerning their company (Callahan & Soileau, 2017).
While the individual definitions of corporate governance vary, they all contain
one crucial element concerning how corporate governance supervises and controls the
organization's management managerial behavior (Silva et al., 2017). The phrase corporate
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governance refers to the control mechanism that governs the management activities
monitored by the board of directors (Vadasi et al., 2020). The companies' system that is
controlled and monitored is called corporate governance (Heenetigala, Armstrong, &
Clarke, 2011). The traditional definitions of corporate governance do not focus on the
guidance that shareholders exercise on the board of directors and management to ensure
they behave in the best interests (Yeh, 2017). Furthermore, corporate governance has
many definitions to avoid the traditional approach (Vadasi et al., 2020). The traditional
corporate governance approach focused on the legal relationship between managers,
shareholders, and the board of directors.
Corporate governance is a system of rules and regulations that allow the
institutional market to arise to pursue different categories (Ghosh, 2018). To increase the
company's future profits, a company needs to maintain stable corporate governance.
Another definition often associated with corporate governance is a system where firms
are governed, monitored, and directed through the distribution of rights from the board of
directors, shareholders, and management (Douissa & Azrak, 2017). The purpose of this
definition shows how the relationship between boards of directors and management are
controlled and governed by the shareholders.
Furthermore, corporate governance is a set of rules that monitor the connection
between the companies' principals and agents and how they relate to the rights and
responsibilities of shareholders (Adiloglu & Vuran, 2012). This particular definition
emphasizes the system used to regulate the controls of the company. Hence, corporate
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governance identifies the policies, procedures, and rules that the company must follow to
properly control and monitor company performance (Primec & Belak, 2018). Corporate
governance effectiveness depends on the broader environment in which it functions. For
example, legislative environments include enforcement and efficient shareholder
protection laws and general environmental support for businesses (Zainuldin et al., 2018).
The focus of these definitions is how corporate governance governs, monitors, and
controls companies by identifying responsibilities and rights among managers, the board
of directors, and shareholders (Inya et al., 2018).
The most common definition used for corporate governance is the distribution of
rights and responsibilities among different companies (Cretu, 2012). Once the rules and
responsibilities have been identified, the company sees an improvement in the company's
decisions, activities, and affairs. Hence, this definition focuses on corporate governance
that provides the proper foundation to set the company objectives and determines how the
goals are achieved while monitoring company performance. Corporate governance is
often seen as a crucial component for companies that need to improve their economic
efficiency and growth while increasing investor confidence. A corporate governance
system encompasses the connection between the board of directors, shareholders, and
management. It also creates how the company sets objectives while monitoring and
controlling the process (Kumar, Kumar, Gupta, & Sharma, 2017).
Another definition for corporate governance focuses on the set of mechanisms
that affect a company to determine the correct decisions to increase performance while
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also increasing the market value of the company (Abdelbadie & Salama, 2019).
Furthermore, corporate governance shows investors the returns that the shareholders
received on their investments. This definition of corporate governance directly relates to
the principal-agent relationship in agency theory. Agency theory focuses on the
delegation to management to act in the best interests of the shareholders. Management
also has responsibilities to the shareholders, leading to an adverse selection that leads to
agency costs (Maxfield, Wang, & de Sousa, 2018). Therefore, corporation activities are
greatly affected by the size, composition, and involvement of the board of directors. The
board of directors controls and monitors how management acts on behalf of the
shareholders.
The final definition of corporate governance addressed is the structure and
processes used by management to improve corporate accountability, business prosperity,
and improving the shareholder's investments while protecting their other interests (Vadasi
et al., 2020). The basis of this definition is the interests of the shareholders and how they
connect with the company's strategic decisions. In this definition, a company's structure
and process enhances the shareholders' wealthy corporate governance (Ghosh, 2018). The
different groups of definitions connect corporate governance to both company prosperity
and the shareholders' increased value. The main component of corporate governance
definitions is that both the company and shareholders see an increase in value or profit.
The differences between the above definitions of corporate governance illuminate
the different views of researchers. The variance between the different definitions is
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because of the diverse subjects covered by corporate governance and different
researchers' viewpoints. Every scholar has a different intellectual background or interest
that affects their definition of corporate governance. The definitions of these scholars are
revised based on the topic researched. Even with these sizable numbers of corporate
governance definitions, there are some common aspects. The previous descriptions all
refer to a conflict of interest between management and shareholders, and a conflict of
interest between insiders and outsiders when management and ownership are separate
(Vadasi et al., 2020). Corporate governance works best when the board of directors,
managers, shareholders, auditors, and employees all have the same objective in mind for
the company.
Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting in Regional Banks
Corporate governance affects large banks, as well as regional banks throughout
the United States. Corporate governance standards could be more organized and
sustainable in regional banks than larger banks (Nazir & Afza, 2018). Many of the
regional bank's board of directors comprises management from the bank instead of
people who have no connection to the bank. Consisting of a board of too many insiders
can cause a conflict of interest because they are too afraid of going against management.
This section explores the practices of corporate governance in regional banks within the
Midwest.

Corporate governance in regional banks. Corporate governance in regional
banks lacks structure because of the lack of professional management strategies, human
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resource capabilities, and investment confidence (Ghosh, 2018). Many of the previous
studies found that corporate governance systems are variable in regional banks. After the
severe financial crisis, many regional banks began to establish corporate governance
standards and principles. However, standard corporate governance arrangements are
often inhibited by increased regulations (Al-Maghzom et al., 2016). Investor protection
and ownership structures are a fundamental factor affecting corporate governance in the
banking sector. Good corporate governance is crucial for the banking sector (Anginer et
al., 2016). Regional banks need to create corporate governance that keeps both the
shareholder and mangers interests in alignment.
In the banking sector, there are rules and regulations for conducting business,
legal and regulatory systems to protect investors' obligations and rights, and penalties for
violators. However, the lack of monitoring and enforcement of corporate governance
policies causes problems. The banking sector needs to ensure the proper processes and
effective corporate governance are implemented (Awolowo et al., 2018). Hence, legal
and regulatory systems should include enacting rules and regulations and setting up
mechanisms for enforcing rules and regulations. Furthermore, the legal framework for
effective corporate governance exists, but compliance is insubstantial or absent (Lemma
& Negash, 2016). Enforcement is often more critical in the banking sector (Silkoset et al.,
2016). The banking sector needs to have a framework to help ensure effective corporate
governance can be achieved. Banks need to create a structure that minimizes agency
conflict while allowing shareholders to trust management to work on their behalf.
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In general, annual reports and websites of publicly listed banks are feeble in
voluntary disclosure (Primec & Belak, 2018). A lack of disclosure transparency and
corruption among the banking sector is one of the most significant barriers to economic
growth, economic development, and stability in the regional banks (Rossi, Nerino, &
Capasso, 2015). Finally, there is a pressing need for a legislative overhaul on the
regulatory agencies that enforce the banking sector's laws and regulations (Kumar et al.,
2017). While there are some regulations in place, the loopholes allow for corruption,
which minimizes shareholders' trust. Banks need to let the public know the framework
for their corporate governance and how it differs from other industries to gain more
investors' confidence.
Financial Reporting in Banks
Financial performance in banks can present a challenge in research both
conceptually and in measurement. According to the Stewardship model, every business
needs to make a profit to increase the bank's value (Bigus & Hillebrand, 2017). While
this is true, not all banks have the same definition of value; researchers use two key
reports when measuring financial performance: accounting perspectives and marketing
perspectives. Most recent empirical studies use the accounting perspective to measure the
company's financial performance; however, this leaves the market-based view
underexamined (Bigus & Hillebrand, 2017).
Generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) have a strict set of accounting
rules and standards that banks must follow. The specific accounting rules and principles
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are chosen based on the objectives and decisions of management. Accounting measures
for financial performance that I found in recent studies include return on assets (ROA),
the return of equity (ROE), and net interest margin (NIM) (Douissa & Azrak, 2017).
Bank financial information is validated by external auditors and contained in the
published financial statements. The financial statements are presumed to be of high
quality and free from manipulations (Balakrishnan & Ertan, 2018). However, published
financial statements can be biased and open to manipulation (Akhidime, 2019).
Profitability Measures
Profitability is a measure companies use to monitor their revenues. The banking
industry has three key ways to measure profitability: return on assets (ROA) and return
on equity (ROE) (Doku, Kpekpena, & Boateng, 2019). Another measure banks use to
look at potential future earnings is the Net interest margin (NIM) (Nguyen, Pham,
Nguyen, Nguyen, & Nguyen, 2019). ROA, ROE, and NIM are key factors investors,
creditors, and managers use to determine companies' financial health.

Return on assets. ROA is a formula companies, creditors, and investors use to
determine how well banks use their assets to generate revenues (Pointer & Khoi, 2019).
Assets vary in every type of industry but especially in banks. The main types of assets
that banks use to generate income are loans and securities (Doku et al., 2019). In banking,
the ROA is determined by using the number of fees charged to customers and its net
interest income (Witherite & Kim, 2006).
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Return on equity. ROE is a formula used by companies to determine the return
on net assets (Raza, Hayat, Farooq, & Bilal, 2020). ROE compares shareholder's equity
concerning the company's profitability (Raza et al., 2020). ROE is a more critical formula
for investors because it analyzes the shareholder's investments' return compared to its
profits. A bank can increase its ROE by increasing its leverage, but too large of an
increase can result in high risks (Shukla, Narayanasamy, & Krishnakumar, 2020).

Net interest margin. NIM is a ratio used by creditors to determine how well the
banks use their assets to produce income (Nguyen et al., 2019). Banks with a higher net
interest and higher margins tend to have a higher potential future margin (Asmar, 2018).
The NIM compares the amount of interest that the bank is earning versus the amount of
interest they are paying (Nguyen et al., 2019). The NIM is often a more stable economic
indicator for banks' financial health than net income (Asmar, 2018). It is essential to look
at the NIM of a bank for several years to ensure the bank is not trying to increase the
margin by making a large number of risky loans (Asmar, 2018).
Corporate Governance Mechanisms
In the aftershock of many entities' global financial crises and financial scandals,
corporate governance had become a substantial issue in the banking sector. Many
solutions have been built upon effective corporate governance mechanisms and external
monitoring mechanisms (El Khoury, 2018). The mechanisms were put into place to
reduce the inefficiencies arising from adverse selection and moral hazard (Agrawal &
Cooper, 2017).
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There are two types of mechanisms: internal audit mechanisms and external
monitoring mechanisms. The companies' activities are monitored and controlled through
internal mechanisms, while external mechanisms comprise the control exercised over
firms by external stakeholders (Onofrei, Firtescu, & Terinte, 2018).

Board independence. Board independence has been an area that regulators have
focused on because it is crucial to reduce the influence on the CEO's influence over the
board of directors (Abdelbadie & Salama, 2019). Regulations only require a certain
amount of board members to be independent. The foundation for the regulations is that if
board members are independent of bank executives, they are more likely to protect the
shareholders (John et al., 2016). An independent board is crucial because they offer
control mechanisms that allow the bank to achieve the firm's objectives (Chahine &
Safieddine, 2011).
Agency theory gives the perspective that external and independent board
members are more valuable than internal board members because they are not as
committed to management and their goals (Kaczmarek, 2017). Internal board members
are often apprehensive about raising sensitive issues related to the CEO's performance
and actions because they feel beholden to the CEO for their jobs. Independent board
members do not have a professional relationship with the CEO; therefore, they do not
hesitate to speak up when something is not right (Al-Matari & Al-Arussi, 2016). Board
members that do not own a large percentage of the company stock are more likely to
monitor and control operations because they look out for the company (Al-Matari & Al-
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Arussi, 2016). Both internal and external board members have a legal obligation to make
sure the decisions are significant to both the company and the stockholders. However,
external board members can face difficulties because they are not directly communicating
with management (Ararat et al., 2017).
An independent board of directors protects shareholders' interest while still
controlling and monitoring the functions to align with management and stakeholders'
interests. Having a majority of independent directors allows the bank to reduce agency
costs while planning and tracking roles more important (Heenetigala et al., 2011).
Independent directors can mitigate the power of management, preventing the misuse of
firm resources and improving performance and market value. However, independent
directors can align themselves with managers instead of stakeholders because they do not
have a stake (Chan & Kogan, 2016). Stewardship theory is another perspective that
argues insider directors have all the information to make better managerial decisions, so
the proponents claim superior bank performance is a result of a board constructed of
primary insiders (Davydov & Swidler, 2016).
Research about firm performance and board independence is mixed (Ahmed,
2016). Several researchers found that board independence improved bank performance,
while other researchers negatively impacted board independence and bank performance
(Isik & Folkinshteyn, 2017). The contrast in findings can be attributed to several different
factors, differences in sample size, performance measures, the study's timeframe, and
independent directors' operational definition (Chu, Dai, & Zhang, 2018). Independent
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directors, as a single factor does not guarantee an increase in the bank's performance. The
success of a bank is a result of many factors working together in correlation. For instance,
many banks are successful when the board consists of a balance between inside and
outside directors (Sorensen & Miller, 2017).

Board committees. Board committees are an internal part of corporate
governance, which ensures managers conduct themself in a way that is in the best interest
of both stakeholders and shareholders (Maxfield et al., 2018). The circumstances and
requirements within the bank determine the number of board committees needed. The
committee's purpose is to help the board of directors perform their duties efficiently and
effectively. The board of directors is responsible for creating policies, rules, and
procedures that outline the committees' responsibilities, duration, and duties. The board
provides a framework for the committee, explaining how the board oversees the
committee. Each committee's composition should consist of an appropriate amount of
independent and non-executive members that identify any activities or actions that may
be a conflict of interest, including the appointment of CEO and integrity of financial and
non-financial reports (Louati & Boujelbene, 2015). Having a mixture of independent and
management members on the board gives great perspectives when deciding which
policies should be created. The four joint committees in regional banks are audit
committees, compensation, human resource committees, nominating and corporate
governance committees, and risk committees.
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Audit committees. According to the Federal Reserve Bank, the audit committee
should consist of three or more board members (Steckler & Clark, 2019). The members
should not have any relationship that may interfere with their independent judgment.
Each committee member should be familiar with the necessary finance and accounting
practices (Lei & Chen, 2019). The shareholders are responsible for issuing rules about the
committee and also appointing members to the committee. Shareholders also identify the
duration and any procedures that a committee needs to follow. One key objective of the
audit committee is to assist the board of directors in ensuring that the bank maintains an
effective internal control system and risk management (Barnham, 2015). The audit
committee should hold regular meetings with external auditors to ensure financial
statements are accurate (Al-Matari & Al-Arussi, 2016). According to the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (SOX) of 2002, both internal and external auditors need to sign off on financial
statements to ensure there is no corruption (Financial stability: Overcoming the crisis and
improving the efficiency of the banking sector, 2009).
An audit committee is consistent with agency theory because it is an additional
mechanism that ensures the shareholders are safeguarded (Samaha & Khlif, 2016). The
audit committee mechanism increases the monitoring and communication between
management, the board of directors, and external auditors (Afsharian & Ahn, 2017).
However, Chao, Yu, Hsiung, and Chen (2018) showed a negative correlation between an
independent audit committee and members with accounting and financial backgrounds.
Companies with financial experts on their audit committee are less likely to restate their
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financial statements (Ali, 2018). This view conflicts with Lei and Chen's (2019)
recommendation for the best practice in corporate governance.
The independence principles state that the audit committee must work
independently and perform all of their duties and responsibilities with professional care
(Jiraporn & Nimmanunta, 2018). Independent audit committees can challenge executive
decisions because they do not have a personal relationship with the bank's managers
(Ajili & Bouri, 2018). Personal relationships can cause problems because there is an
appearance of cooperation or conflict of interest. Audit committees monitor the quality
and flow of information between shareholders, managers, and board members, which
alleviates many agency problems (Chan & Kogan, 2016). However, previous researchers
revealed mixed findings of how committee member independence affects financial
information and internal controls' reliability. While some researchers found a positive
correlation between committee member independence and the reliability of financial data
and internal controls, other researchers found that independent audit committees did not
affect the reliability of financial data and internal controls (Berger, Bouwman, & Kim,
2017; Ong, 2018). Other researchers found that there was a positive connotation between
internal sound controls and an independent audit committee. When audit committee
members have financial and accounting backgrounds, it can increase the likelihood that
material misstatements are found and corrected promptly. Audit committees that
understand the financial statements are also more likely to disclose more information than
banks that do not have an independent audit committee (L'Huillier, 2014).
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Compensation and human resources committee. The board of directors
appointed the compensation and human resources committees to review and approve any
goals and objectives related to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) (Agyei-Mensah, 2017).
The committee also oversees the executive's salary and plans about equity-based
compensation plans (Ajili & Bouri, 2018). The committee has exclusive rights to
terminate any responsibilities, including consultants or experts (Ali, 2018). All the
members of this committee will be appointed annually by the board of directors. There
should be at least three members, and they must agree to (a) satisfy the independence and
other requirements, and (b) qualify as non-employee directors (Agrawal & Cooper,
2017). The compensation and human resources committee need to be independent
members, so they are not to swayed to make decisions.

Nominating and corporate governance committee. The board of directors
created the nominating and corporate governance committees to evaluate the board of
directors on the board members' skills and characteristics and their corporate governance
(Bigus & Hillebrand, 2017). The committee determines the corporate governance of the
company and makes the necessary recommendations for any changes. The committee
should consist of at least three or more committee members that satisfy the independence
rules listed in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) (Mazzotta & Veltri, 2014).

Risk committee. The risk committee is a separate committee that evaluates risk
management, policies, and procedures (Louati & Boujelbene, 2015). The risk committee
member should consist of the executive and non-executive directors and any management
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member involved with the various areas of risk management (Inya et al., 2018). This
committee aims to identify any potential risks and recommend the board to minimize the
potential risks. The committee should meet at least three times a year (Isik &
Folkinshteyn, 2017).
Transition
In Section 1 of this study, I addressed the fundamental issues that have led to
corporate governance's progress as an evolving requirement. Furthermore, Section 1
covered the critical reasons for examining the relationship with corporate governance,
financial reporting, and profitability. In Section 1, I described the general problem and
the specific business problem of the study. The general business problem is the
controversial findings from previous studies failed to provide a consensus concerning the
relationships between corporate governance, financial reporting, and profitability; these
conflicting findings may challenge business leaders' loyalty and compliance with the best
corporate governance practices. The specific business problem is that some leaders do not
know the correlation between effective corporate governance, financial reporting, and
regional banking profitability.
The theoretical framework is agency theory. The theoretical foundations
addressed in the literature review through 4 main parts frame the research questions and
hypotheses. The literature review comprises (a) corporate governance theories, (b) the
concepts and definitions of corporate governance, (c) corporate governance and financial
reporting in regional banks, and (d) corporate governance mechanisms. In Section 2, I
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addressed the study's proposed methodology to explain (a) research method and design,
(b) population and sampling, (c) data collection, (d) data analysis technique, and (e)
reliability and validity of the study. In Section 3, I presented and interpreted the findings
obtained from the data process and analysis. I also presented (a) the conclusions, (b)
applications to professional practice, (c) recommendations for actions and further study,
and (d) the implication for social change intended for improving business practice.
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Section 2: The Project
Appropriate application and thorough enforcement of effective corporate
governance mechanisms are crucial to the survival and growth of publicly listed firms
(Popescu, 2019). Strong corporate governance helps leaders meet their legal requirements
and alleviate any conflicts of interest. Corporate governance can also make a firm
appealing to potential investors. Investigating and providing evidence on the relationship
between corporate governance, financial reporting, and profitability can enable the firm's
executives to comply with the legal requirements (Bonna, 2011). Banks will also need to
develop socially responsible behaviors, which in return can help lower the manager's cost
of capital and enhance profitability and the reputation of the firms (Bonna, 2011). This
section details a description of the proposed study's methodology and design features.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the
relationship between corporate banking governance, banking financial reporting, and
regional bank's profitability by using ROA, ROE, and NIM. The independent variables
were three mechanisms of corporate governance and financial reporting, (a) mature
program, (b) new program, and (c) no program. An evaluation of each variable was done
independently before comparison for a more thorough strategic analysis. The dependent
variable was profitability from 2015 through 2018. The target population consisted of
executive leadership in regional banks located in the Midwest United States. This study
may lead to positive social change by equipping owners with information on strategies
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that may provide new ways to reconfigure corporate governance and financial reporting,
promoting operational efficiency and an economic contribution to state and local
economies.
Role of the Researcher
My role as the researcher was to (a) select the topic, (b) design the study, (c)
collect the data, (d) provide peer-reviewed or seminal sources, and (e) plan the approach,
as well as present (a) the summary, (b) conclusion, (c) recommendations, and (d) the
social implications of the study integrated with the conclusion. This study's population
was the publicly listed regional banks in the Midwest for the period 2015–2018. The
sample choice was based on the availability of corporate governance data and years in
business. Management scholars called this type of sampling nonprobability of
convenience sampling (Matlakala, Chiliya, Chuchu, & Ndoro, 2019; Shivani & Rashmi,
2019). I reviewed the data for 100 banks for this study. However, I only used 80 banks
because 20 did not have corporate governance in place. These 20 banks did not have their
corporate governance or financial information available. For multiple regression studies,
researchers suggest using Tabachnick and Fidell's (2013) formula for establishing the
study's sample size: N>50+8(m). N is the number of selected banks, while m is the
number of the study's independent variables (Bujang, Sa'at, Ikhwan, & Sidik, 2017). The
sample size of this study should be at least 50+8(3) =74 samples. Therefore, the sample
size of 80 banks was a sufficient size for drawing the generalization about the study's
population as a whole.
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I worked to ensure that the data sources were reliable and valid and that the
collected data were analyzed, interpreted, and presented ethically. The data of corporate
governance mechanisms, financial reporting, and profitability came from the banks'
printed or electronic annual reports and the FDIC website. The data collection biases can
be prevented by clear and careful preparation of the data collection process, using
multiple sources of data, choosing a sample that represents the population, and using
proper measurement metrics. To ensure the reliability and validity of data and the
information in this study, I used the typical technique to collect secondary data and avoid
the discrepancy of collecting primary data.
Participants
Researchers should impartially select the participants, protect the participants
from any harm, and ensure the confidentiality of participants. Researchers should also be
truthful and courteous to all individuals participating in the research (Fujii, 2012). no
human participants were involved in this study. Therefore, participants' protection
procedures and documents, such as confidentiality protocols and informed consent forms,
and precautions for preserving participants' integrity and impartiality were not required.
Because there were no participants in this study, the Belmont Report did not apply.
In Section 3 of the application to professional practice and implications for
change, I will provide analysis descriptions, explain the characteristics of input variables
related to bank financial performance and profitability, and ensure analysis and ethically
interpret the study's data. I have worked as a business owner and instructor for more than
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23 years for various organizations. This has allowed me to accumulate expertise in
corporate finance, financial analysis, corporate governance, and risk management. This
experience has also allowed me to experience corporate governance systems and
mechanisms, corporate performance, and profitability issues relevant to addressing the
purpose and research questions for this study. This amassed expertise helped me better
comprehend and assist in the complete study. My assisting role ensured no bias in data
collection and sampling and the statistical analysis and interpretation.
Research Method and Design
There are three different approaches when conducting studies: qualitative,
quantitative, and mixed methods. Consideration was taken when reviewing the three
different approaches to determine the appropriate approach for this study. The choice of
research methods needed to align with the research questions. Therefore, the
methodology can be qualitative, quantitative, or a combination of both approaches
(Callaghan, 2019; Daniel, 2019). The qualitative approach is suitable when previous
studies have not been conducted on specific social problems or if the study variables are
not noticeably identified. The quantitative approach is best because it helps test theories
by examining the correlation between the independent and dependent variables.
Furthermore, the quantitative approach depends on collecting and analyzing
numerical, categorical, or ordinal data (Callaghan, 2019). The mixed-methods approach
is appropriate when either the qualitative or quantitative method is not appropriate to
address the specific business problem because it allows the researcher to use a
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combination of both methods (Bonna, 2011). The qualitative approach was not
appropriate for this study because my study aimed to examine the relationship between
corporate governance, financial reporting, and profitability by examining the variables'
statistical relationship. Furthermore, the mixed approach requires ample time to collect,
analyze, and process the data that can be rigorous (Callaghan, 2019). Therefore, the
quantitative method was best suited as a means to examine my primary question and
secondary data. The crucial representations of quantitative research lie in the numbers,
objectivity, and generalizability of the data.
Research Method
This study used the quantitative correlational research method to test the resulting
hypothesis and answer the research questions. Quantitative research primarily focuses on
testing hypotheses and theories (Crane, Henriques, & Haskel, 2017). Researchers use the
quantitative method questions to examine the relationships and variances among the
variables, while in a quantitative hypothesis, the researchers test to find the relationship
among the variables (Callaghan, 2019; Crane et al., 2017). Quantitative analysis is used
to examine the relationship between variables. The independent and dependent variables
can be measured using secondary (archival) data or primary data from instruments, which
allows the data to be analyzed and interpreted using statistical measures (Daniel, 2019).
Post-positivist researchers often use quantitative research to examine the
relationships between independent and dependent variables. The association between
independent and dependent variables can be posed as questions or hypotheses.
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Quantitative research is deductive; therefore, it starts with a general case and then moves
to the specific problem (Barnham, 2015). The quantitative approach is used to form a
relationship between the independent and dependent variables through hypothesis and
research questions and then examine the relationship between them (Popescu, 2019).
There was an alignment between my study and the post-positivist worldview because
both aimed to identify the relationship between corporate governance, financial reporting,
and profitability. Post-positivist assumptions better align with quantitative studies than
qualitative. Furthermore, the quantitative study was the most appropriate method for this
study because it examined the relationship between the independent and dependent
variables.
Research Design
The most appropriate way to examine the relationship between corporate
governance, financial reporting, and profitability was to use a quantitative correlational
research design. A quantitative correlational study's emphasis is to examine the possible
relationships amongst the variables (Barnham, 2015). Hence a quantitative correlational
design study aligns with a post-positivist worldview (Popescu, 2019). The post-positivist
worldview is also a good mechanism to use in scientific methods to understand social
problems' complexities by utilizing numerical measures and testing the hypothesis. The
quantitative correlational design is best for the proposal language because the purpose of
the study is to study the relationships among corporate governance, financial reporting,
and profitability (Zulfikar et al., 2017). The experimental design and quasi-experimental
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design were not appropriate for this study. An experimental design best fits studies in
which cause and effect relationships of variables are examined. The quasi-experimental
design best fits studies in which intervention’s causal effect within a targeted population
on a study of control groups are assessed (Vadasi et al., 2020). The key difference
between correlation designs and experimental and quasi-experimental designs is that
correlation does not signify cause and effect relationship or causation by manipulating
independent variables (Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016). Hence, a quantitative correlational
design is best suited to investigate the relationships between corporate governance,
financial reporting, and profitability.
The independent variables in the regression model were three corporate
governance and financial reporting mechanisms (a) mature program, (b) new program,
and (c) no program. The dependent variables in the study were profitability. I used ROA,
ROE, and NIM to measure the profitability of the banks. ROA and ROE are the most
popular value-based measures of profitability (Agrawal & Cooper, 2017; Balakrishnan &
Ertan, 2018). ROA determines the firm's growth over the specific period, while ROE
clarifies a company's profitability compared to other companies within the same industry
for a specific period. ROA and ROE are used by investors to determine that the higher
the return on assets and the higher the return on equity, the companies show a greater
financial performance (Drum et al., 2016). Tobin's q was a tool that measured the market
value of the banks. Tobin's q is the most common measure in empirical corporate
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governance because it considers the risks and is less likely to misrepresent the findings
(Silva et al., 2017).
Population and Sampling
The FDIC website lists 100 regional banks in the Midwest. In this study, I
excluded the firms that did not have corporate governance or financial reports available.
The exclusion of these banks was due to different reporting standards applicable to these
banks, making it difficult to compare the banks' financial performance compared to other
industries. I used the remaining 80 publicly listed banks as the general population
(Systems, 2012; See Appendix A).
There are various sampling techniques. The various techniques include (a)
purposive, (b) convenience, (c) simple random, and (d) stratified random sample. The
selection of the study sample is based on the available data in specific years. Researchers
call this type of sampling nonprobability or convenience sampling (Popescu, 2019).
In the nonprobability sampling technique, researchers select study samples based
on the current availability of information (Davydov & Swidler, 2016). The specific
sample was 80 regional banks listed on the FDIC website for the years 2015–2018.
Newly established banks were eliminated from the study because the new companies do
not have enough time to implement the corporate governance and financial reporting
mechanisms Furthermore, new banks can also be negatively impacted due to cash flow
problems within the business and low financial responsibility because they focus on
expanding the bank (Bonna, 2011). A bank operating for at least 5 years have had
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sufficient time to implement corporate governance practices and improve their financial
performance (Bonna, 2011). Companies that have been in existence for longer periods of
time tend to have more awareness from regulators, investors, analysts, and corporate
governance practices are apparent. All banks chosen were publicly listed before
2015.There were several factors that led to choosing banks from 2015–2018 (a)
availability of data and financial statements, (b) corporate governance, and (c) financial
information throughout tests such as ROA, ROE, and NIM. Corporate governance and
financial information are available on the bank's websites as well as the FDIC database.
The fiscal year of the chosen banks reflected the calendar year, and there was no change
to their fiscal year during the period researched. Furthermore, the banks were listed on
the New York Stock Exchange for the period researched.
Ethical Research
I was responsible for demonstrating the honesty and reliability, and credibility of
the research methodologies (Carus & Ogilvie, 2009). For this quantitative study, I
developed an ethical approach applied to every stage of the research (Cokley & Awad,
2013). Each Walden doctoral student must obtain Institutional Review Board (IRB)
approval to gather, analyze, and complete the research. The IRB members' prominent
roles to ensure the studies meet the criteria and acceptability of practices and standards
for professional conduct, institutional regulations, and any applicable laws (John et al.,
2016).

56
The data was collected from the financial institution's websites, SEC, and FDIC
websites. The study data was selected by the bank's names using their annual reports and
then saved to a password-protected thumb drive and arranged alphabetically by the bank
names. There were not any human participants in the study. Hence, there was no need for
participant protection procedures, confidentiality agreements, or informed consent forms.
For protection purposes, the data handled had strict security measures. After collection
and the study publication, the data will be stored for 5 years before deletion.
Data Collection Instruments
The data collection is broken into three headings instruments, data collection
techniques, and data collection organizations. Instruments are tools that were used to
collect, define, and process the data assembled (Carus & Ogilvie, 2009). Data collection
in this study was used to gather data to be analyzed and interpreted through secondary
sources. Data organization techniques, however, represented the data collection for
statistical analysis and explanation.
Instruments
There is no universally accepted definition for corporate governance mechanisms,
definitions, instrumentations, metrics, and indexes in corporate governance research. The
researcher's purpose and interest determine corporate governance's focus and definition
(Agyei-Mensah, 2017). Researchers used several indexes, instruments, and metrics to
analyze corporate governance, financial reporting, and profitability to measure the
different variables.
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Corporate governance indexes have varied as much as the definition of corporate
governance in academic literature. One index that has become widely used is the GIndex. The G-Index has become popular due to the consistency in scores (Gulati,
Kattamuri, & Kumar, 2019). The G-index is straightforward and easy to use. Another
benefit of using the G-index is the transparency and ease of reproduction
(Mohammadreza & Farzaneh, 2018). Hence, G-index accurately and objectively reflects
the relationship between corporate governance, financial performance, and profitability
(Bonna, 2011; Gulati et al., 2019). The research questions and literature review allowed
different sets of indexes to be used, such as the equal-weighting approach in the G-index
construction (Bonna, 2011). In this study, each variable's indexes were calculated each
year for the specified period between 2015 and 2018. The amounts were then added to
estimate each variable index's total score and then divided by 4 to get the average score
index calculation. The following addresses the measurement of the independent and
dependent variables.
Corporate Governance
I developed a mature index value by assigning an equal-weighted approach of 1
point for each year the corporate governance was in effect. A program that was in effect
for 10 years would have 10 points, whereas an operation for 15 years would have 15
points (Gulati et al., 2019; Mohammadreza & Farzaneh, 2018). I developed a new
program index value by assigning an equal, weighted approach of 1 point for each year
the corporate governance was in effect. A program that was in effect for 1 year would
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only have 1 point, whereas one in operation for 9 years would have 9 points
(Mohammadreza & Farzaneh, 2018). I developed a matrix for companies that did not
have any corporate governance. If a company did not have any corporate governance,
they received a 0 (Mohammadreza & Farzaneh, 2018).
Financial Reporting
Financial reporting is used by organizations to demonstrate the business activities
and financial performance of the company. I developed a mature index value by
assigning a value for the banks financial reporting. If there was no financial reporting
then they received a 0 (Mohammadreza & Farzaneh, 2018). Banks that had 1-20 years’
worth of financial reporting were assigned a 1 value (Mohammadreza & Farzaneh, 2018).
Banks that had 21 plus years received a 2 for the financial reporting (Mohammadreza &
Farzaneh.
Financial Performance
The corporate performance was measured by ROA, ROE, and NIM. ROA is the
ratio used to measure the profitability of a company. The higher the ratio, the higher the
company's profitability. ROE is a ratio used to measure the amount of net income to
equity. The higher the ratio, the larger the ratio means investors receive a higher return on
their investment (Ghosh, 2018). NIM is a ratio that measures the profits a company
receives from its investments. A positive number means they have been making sound
investment decisions; a negative number means that the bank has made poor investment
decisions.
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Nature of the Variables
Corporate governance and financial reporting were an example of nominal
variables because they were attributes that were being measured. A nominal variable also
has more than two categories but there is not an intrinsic order to the categories (Bonna,
2011). ROA, ROE, and NIM were examples of continuous numeric variables because
there was an unlimited number of options for their values. A variable is discrete when
there a specific points that can be plotted on a line (Bonna, 2011).
Data Collection Technique
The collection of financial statements and corporate governance information of
each firm was collected from public documents such as annual reports, FDIC, and bank
websites from 2015-2018. I used content analysis techniques to analyze the available data
(Al-Najjar & Al-Najja, 2017). One method used to study communication content is
content analysis. The content analysis includes empirical measurements and also
theoretical definitions. Content analysis allows the researcher to create objective and
systematic criteria to transform the written text into reliable data that can be analyzed for
the symbolic content of communication (Bonna, 2011). The financial statements used
included income statements and balance sheets. The corporate governance and financial
reporting factors were collected from the annual reports. The corporate governance
factors included (a) mature program, (b) new program, and (c) no program. The
profitability information that was collected includes (a) ROA, (b) ROE, and (c) NIM.
Combining the data is important to create indexes, scores, and ratios. The indexes and
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ratios made it easier to create a score or a single number. The data and information
collected were a great instrument that enabled me to analyze and examine the relationship
between corporate governance, financial reporting, and profitability
Data Analysis
Before the multiple regression analysis was conducted, I analyzed a sample
correlation matrix. The correlation matrix allowed me to reject or accept the individual
null hypothesis for each of the independent variables' mechanisms. The correlation
matrix identified which variables should be included in the actual regression analysis.
Once the data was collected and analyzed, then the appropriate scores and indexes
for each variable were created. I then analyzed the data statistically to test the hypothesis
and answer the research question. A theoretical framework was created in section 1 based
on the agency theory to connect the independent variables of corporate governance and
financial reporting and the dependent variables ROA, ROE, and NIM. I then addressed
the research question and tested the hypotheses using Minitab multiple regression
statistical software program.
Multiple regression models have been used in corporate governance studies to
examine the relationship between corporate governance and financial reporting with
profitability. For instance, Ameni, Bilel, and Abdelfettah (2017) examined the impact of
corporate governance mechanisms and financing activities using multiple regression
analysis models. Multiple regression models have also been used to examine the
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance (Davydov & Swidler,

61
2016). Furthermore, multiple regression analysis can specify the relationship between
corporate governance mechanisms and commercial banks (Steckler & Clark, 2019). Still,
other researchers have used regression analysis to measure corporate governance's effect
on firm value, measured by economic value (Krenn, 2016). Bonna (2011) measured
corporate governance by using multiple regression to investigate the relationship between
corporate governance and financial performance.
Multiple regression analysis is a statistical instrument that analyzes data within
many different designs. Multiple regression analyzes the data to recognize the
relationship between two or more variables. In this study, multiple regression analysis
was used to examine the relationship between corporate governance, financial reporting,
and profitability in regional banks within the Midwest. The objective was to conclude if
effective corporate governance correlated with better financial reporting and increased
profitability. The study model is given in the equation:
Y= α+β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X4 … βnXn+ €
where Y is the dependent variable and X1… Xn is the independent variable, α is the
intercept, and € is a random error variable. The β1…. βn are the beta coefficients of the
independent variables (Bonna, 2011).
I used standard multiple linear regression. I chose multiple regression models
after thorough consideration of other quantitative tools, including correlational analysis,
simple linear analysis, and ANOVA analysis of variances (Bonna, 2011). Correlational
analysis and the simple linear analysis examine the relationship between only two
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variables (Mazzotta & Veltri, 2014). The study's purpose and the type of independent and
dependent variables led to multiple regression analysis choices. Multiple regression
analysis allowed me to examine three strengths of the relationships between the two
independent variables and three dependent variables (Rossi et al., 2015). The generic
equations for the model are:
ROA=α+β1X1+€
ROE=α+β2X2+β3X3+€
NIM= α+β1X1+β2X2+β3X3+€
If the null hypothesis is not rejected, then the conclusion is that there is no linear
relationship between the independent and dependent variables (Bonna, 2011). However,
if the null hypothesis is rejected, the conclusion is that there is a statistically linear
relationship between the independent and dependent variables (Bonna, 2011). The
multiple regression techniques automatically produce t-statistics. Furthermore, there were
six t-tests for each one of the correlation coefficients to identify which independent
variables explain the variations in the three dependent variables (ROA, ROE, NIM). I
used the multiple correlation coefficient to determine (adjusted R2) to examine the
overall percentage of the dependent variables' variation explained by the independent
variables. The null hypothesis of this study is rejected if the p-value is less than α, .05.
Study Validity
Validity in the study refers to the level that specific measurement satisfies for
which it was collected (Cokley & Awad, 2013). This study used secondary data because I
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obtained the information from public databases and its documents. There are two main
types of validity: internal and external. Internal validity focuses on confirming that the
dependent variable's variations are due to variations in the independent variables instead
of external factors (Dekker, 2016). There was no consideration for internal validity in this
study because internal validity addressed the causal relationship's cause and effect
relationship where it is most relevant (Rausch & Wall, 2015). Next, I examined external
validity. External validity in quantitative research is crucial in determining the research
results in the entire population or other samples (Zulfikar et al., 2017). Hence, for this
study, inferential statistical techniques that include hypothesis testing and ANOVA were
good statistical analyses for generalizing the study's population.
This study created a group of metrics following the G-index approach and ensured
the metrics covered are all needed material for this study. The study data review tested
whether the data set reflects data on corporate governance mechanisms, financial
reporting, and profitability to ensure the theoretical concepts are measured consistently
(Ahmed, 2016). I used appropriate sampling procedures and statistical tests. Furthermore,
reliable measurement procedures avoid type I and type II errors for having statistical
validity conclusions of the study. To improve the statistical validity requires selecting the
proper sampling procedures, proper statistical tests, and the appropriate measurement
procedures of the study (Agyei-Mensah, 2017).
The validity of the multiple regression model was confirmed by addressing the
assumptions for multiple regression analysis. The assumptions for multiple regression
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models include (a) outliers, (b) linearity, (c) multicollinearity, (d) homoscedasticity, (e)
normality, (f) and independence of residuals (Maxfield et al., 2018). When the
assumptions are not met, the results could be considered untrustworthy, leading to underor overestimating the effect size or significance or a type I or type II error (Bernard,
Gledson, Vikramaditya, Woochan, & Burcin, 2017). Several different outlier tests can be
performed. Dixon, Grubbs, Tietjen-Moore, Generalized Extreme Studentized Deviate
(ESD) tests are a few outlier tests. When trying to detect non-linearity, there are three
significant ways to see linearity: (a) utilizing previous research to inform current analysis,
(b) examining residual plots, and (c) routinely running a regression analysis that includes
curvilinear components (Feils et al., 2018). The collinearity (Collin) analysis and
variance inflation factor (VIF) are two analyses used to detect multicollinearity (Bujang
et al., 2017). The Levine's test or regression standardized predicted value are ways to
verify or check via visual examination the homoscedasticity assumption (Silva et al.,
2017).
Visual inspection of data plots, kurtosis, and skew are examples of testing
normality assumptions (Alali, Anandarajan, & Jiang, 2012). Non-parametric statistical
techniques are often used by researchers when the parametric assumptions are in doubt or
not met. Hence, bootstrapping and transformation are some examples of a parametric
statistical technique. While transformations can improve normality, it can make the
interpretations more complex. Therefore, transformations need to be used cautiously
(Gulati et al., 2019). Furthermore, bootstrapping helps eliminate the need for data
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transformation. For this study, I used bootstrapping when the parametric assumptions
were not satisfied. In situations where the assumptions were not satisfied, it is beneficial
to compute a bootstrap confidence interval that does not rely on the parametric
assumptions. Bootstrapping is a useful method to attain vigorous non-parametric
estimates of confidence intervals (Hubbard & Carriquiry, 2019; Yong & Seong-Jung,
2019).
Transition and Summary
Section 2 began by restating the purpose statement and the reasons for conducting
the study. Section 2 presented (a) a description of my role as the researcher. (b) the
methodologies, (c) strategies, (d) techniques, (e) variables' metrics, and (f) reliability and
validity of the study. Section 2 presented the reasons for selecting the quantitative method
to conduct this study. Furthermore, Section 2 addressed the reasons for choosing 80
publicly listed regional banks as the sample size from January 2015–December 2018
financial years. The source of the secondary data was the FDIC website and the sampled
companies' websites. Section 2 included a discussion of the data collection techniques,
the reason for choosing multiple regression modeling, and a description of the reliability
and validity of the study's instruments. Section 3 presented and interpreted the findings
obtained from the data analysis, as well as contained (a) summary, (b) conclusion, (c)
recommendations, and (d) the social implications of the study integrated with the
conclusion.
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Section 3: Application to Professional Practice and Implications for Change
The relationship between corporate governance, financial reporting, and ROA,
ROE, and NIM, has gained widespread prominence in the economy. Researchers have
examined this relationship; however, the findings have been mixed, and researchers have
not had any concurrence in the findings. Researchers have found negative, positive, and
neutral relationships between corporate governance, financial reporting, and profitability
(Adiloglu & Vuran, 2012; Alali et al., 2012; Ararat et al., 2017). The purpose of my study
was to augment the relationship between corporate governance, financial performance,
and profitability in regional banks. The theoretical framework of this study is based on
agency theory. This section is organized into eight principal headings: (a) introduction,
(b) presentation of findings. (c) applications of professional practice, (d) implications for
social change, (e) recommendations for action, (f) recommendations for further study, (g)
reflections, and (h) conclusions.
Introduction
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to investigate the
relationship between corporate governance and financial reporting and (a) profitability of
Midwestern regional banks from 2015–2018. This study's main focus was to illuminate
the importance of corporate governance and financial reporting in profitability. This was
to help investors and customers understand how corporate governance and financial
reporting influences and profitability and the economic growth within the community.
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In general, the study's findings revealed that there is not a statistically significant
relationship between corporate governance and financial reporting mechanisms and
profitability. However, the results did show there was a substantial relationship between
ROA, ROE, and NIM. The findings showed that corporate governance and financial
reporting mechanisms did not have a significant connection with profitability. The results
demonstrated that board independence did not have a statistically significant relationship
with ROA, ROE, and NIM.
Presentation of the Findings
The fundamental purpose of this study was to find the answer to the research
question. Research Question (RQ): What relationship exists between corporate
governance, financial reporting, and banking institution profitability?
This section includes inferential statistical analysis and a detailed description of
the study’s research findings. I concluded data analyses using MINITAB. The MINITAB
file contained inferential statistics regarding corporate governance and financial reporting
and profitability of the sampled banks. Inferential statistics included, for example,
ANOVA analysis, t-test, and multiple regression analysis. ANOVA helps identify
whether or not to reject the null hypothesis via the p-value. A t-test explains the variation
in the dependent variables and which independent variable has clarifying value.
Testing the Assumptions
This section includes the five assumptions tests and the results of those
assumption tests. Assumption testing is in statistics to ensure that the data is trustworthy.
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If an assumption is not met it can result in a Type I or Type II error which means that the
results are not trustworthy (Osborne & Waters, 2002). Through the testing I was able to
determine that a multicollinearity regression test would be best for my chosen study.
Below is the explanations and tables for the outliers, linearity, homoscedasticity,
normality, and independence of residuals tests.
Outliers. The first assumption test performed was the outlier test. The outlier test
identifies any data that deviates from the other data within the sample (Maxfield et al.,
2018). An outlier can be identified by using a histogram, frequency distribution, or
converting the data to z-scores (Osborne & Waters, 2002). Upon observation of the data
in Table 1, I concluded that there was one significant outlier that needed to be removed.
Table 1 shows the Grubbs test for outliers. Table 2 shows the removed outlier.
Table 1.
Outliers for 2015-2018, Grubbs' Test
Variable
ROA
ROE
NIM
CG
FR

N
320
320
320
320
320

Mean
1.0335
9.365
3.1615
90.64
1.9375

StDev
0.6062
3.602
0.8060
49.92
0.2424

Min
-0.3800
-2.260
0.0062
8.00
1.0000

Max
6.7034
21.056
4.6300
184.00
2.0000

G
9.35
3.25
3.91
1.87
3.87

P
0.000
0.344
0.024
1.000
0.029

Table 2.
Outliers removed
Year
2015

CG
141

FR
2

ROA
7

ROE
10

NIM
3
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Linearity. The second assumption test that I performed was the linearity test. A
linearity test measures if the data was linear. When performing a multiple regression test
it is important that the independent and dependent variables are linear (Osborne &
Waters, 2002). If there is not a linear relationship between the independent and dependent
variables then it can cause an under-estimation of the relationships (Osborne & Waters,
2002). After performing the linearity test it was determined that the data was linear which
identifies that a multiple regression analysis would be appropriate. Figure 1 through
Figure 3 below shows the results of the linearity test for the dependent and independent
variables. Linearity was not met for ROA or ROE; linearity was met for NIM.

Figure 1. Scatterplot of residuals for independent variables vs ROA
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Figure 2. Scatterplot of residuals for independent variables vs ROE

Figure 3. Scatterplot of residuals for independent variables vs NIM
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Homoscedasticity. The third assumption test that I performed was the
homoscedasticity test. Homoscedasticity looks to see if the variance of errors in the same
across all levels (Osborne & Waters, 2002). The assumptions of homoscedasticity can be
measured visually by looking at the plot of standardized errors (Osborne & Waters,
2002). I was able to visually identify based on Figures 1 and 2 that the data was not
randomly scattered around the horizontal line which indicates ROA and ROE are not
homoscedasticity. Figure 3 above does however show that NIM does have
homoscedasticity.
Normality. The fourth assumption that I tested was the normality test. A
normality test shows if the data is normally distributed (Maxfield et al., 2018). When
performing assumption testing, a regression test assumes that the variables have a normal
distribution (Osborne & Waters, 2002). If data is not normal then it can skew the results
by distorting the relationships between the variables (Osborne & Waters, 2002). I was
able to identify that the data was not normal from my inspection of the data plot for ROA.
Figure 4 shows the data plot for ROA with the outliers. Figure 5 shows the data plot with
the outliers removed. Figure 6 shows the data plot for ROE and figure 7 shows the data
plot for NIM. I did however identify that NIM was normal based on a visual inspection.
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Figure 4. P-P normality plot for ROA without outliers removed

Figure 5. P-P normality plot for ROA with outliers removed
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Figure 6. Probability plot for normality of ROE
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Figure 7. Probability plot for normality of NIM
Independence of Residuals. The last assumption test was the independence of
residuals. The independence of residuals test shows that there is independence (Maxfield
et al., 2018). The Durbin-Watson value was near 2.0, indicating there was an
independence of residuals. Table 3 shows the independence of residuals for corporate
governance, financial reporting, and ROA. The Durbin-Watson statistic was 1.991 which
shows there was an independence of residual. Table 4 shows the independence of
residuals for corporate governance, financial reporting and ROE. The Durbin-Watson
was 1.855 which shows there was an independence of residuals. Y=Table 5 shows the
independence of residuals between corporate governance, financial reporting and NIM.
The Durbin-Watson was 1.978 which shows an independence of residuals.
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Table 3.
Model Summary with Durbin-Watson for independence of residuals, FR + CG vs. ROA

Model
1

R
.091a

Model Summary
Adjusted R
R Square
Square
.008
.002

Std. Error of
the Estimate
.60555

DurbinWatson
1.991

Table 4.
Model Summary with Durbin-Watson for independence of residuals, FR + CG vs. ROE

Model
1

R
.133a

Model Summary
Adjusted R
R Square
Square
.018
.011

Std. Error of
the Estimate
3.58160

DurbinWatson
1.855

Table 5.
Model Summary with Durbin-Watson for independence of residuals, FR + CG vs. NIM

Model
1

R
.084a

Model Summary
Adjusted R
R Square
Square
.007
.001

Std. Error of
the Estimate
.80566

DurbinWatson
1.978

The outlier test showed one outlier that needed to be removed. The outlier was
then removed. The linearity test showed that not all the data were linear. The normality
test identified only one as being approximately normal. The homoscedasticity test
showed independence of variance. The independence of residuals showed ROA, ROE,
and NIM with a value below 2 which shows an independence of residuals. Even though
not all assumptions were met, I decided to go ahead and use a multiple regression for my
study. Since the data was financial data it did not matter if all the assumptions were met.
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Inferential Statistical Analysis of the Study Sampled Banks
The heading presents the relationship between corporate governance and financial
reporting and the dependent variables of the study. The title includes analyzing the linear
relationship between corporate governance, financial reporting and the dependent
variables and then presents the multiple regression findings in tables. The first
subheading illustrates the relationship between corporate governance, financial reporting,
ROA, ROE, and NIM. The next subheading includes the analysis of corporate
governance, financial reporting and ROA. The third subheading consists of the analysis
of corporate governance, financial reporting and ROE. The fourth subheading consists of
the analysis of corporate governance, financial reporting and NIM.

ROA, ROE, and NIM. I checked the multicollinearity among the independent
variables using multiple regression and examining the relationships between corporate
governance and financial reporting, and the dependent variables. Multicollinearity exists
when two or more predictors in a multiple regression model are highly related or
correlated, as one independent variable can be predicted from other independent
variables. Multicollinearity is not a problem in the multiple regression model if the
tolerance static between two explanatory variables falls above .40. Low tolerance means
high multicollinearity, and increased tolerance means low multicollinearity. Table 6
presents the correlation of the dependent and independent variables for multiple
regression models for testing the multicollinearity among these variables. The table
illustrates that multicollinearity does not represent a problem in the study. As per the
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correlation matrix, the second highest correlation between the two explanatory variables
is positive 8.8% between CG and ROA. Also, the table identifies the pairwise correlation
of negative 13.1% which is between FR and ROE. I tested the relationship between
corporate governance, financial reporting and ROA, ROE, and NIM. The results were not
significant, F(1, 60) = .75, R2 = XX.
Table 6.
Correlation Matrix of Corporate Governance and Financial reporting

FR
CG

ROE

ROA

NIM

-0.131
-0.071

0.014
0.088

-0.005
0.075

ROA. Next, I checked the multicollinearity among the independent variables and
ROA as the dependent variable using multiple regression between examining the
relationship between corporate governance, financial reporting, and the dependent
variable of ROA. Table 6 represents the correlation of all the study explanatory variables
for multiple regression models for testing the multicollinearity among these variables.
The table illustrates that multicollinearity was not a problem in this study. Table 7 below
shows the correlation between corporate governance, financial reporting and ROA. Table
8 shows the ANOVA for corporate governance, financial reporting, and ROA. The
significance is .269 which is above .05. Since it is above the p-value it shows that there is
not a significant relationship between corporate governance, financial reporting, and
ROA. Table 9 shows the significance is .110 for corporate governance and .694 for
financial reporting which shows that there is not a statistically significant relationship
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between the independent and dependent variables. As per the correlation matrix, the
highest correlation between the two explanatory variables is positive 8.8%. The second
highest pairwise correlation between ROA and CG was a positive 1.4%. When VIF is
equal to 1 there is not multicollinearity (Amiati, 2019). If the VIF is above 1 then the
predictors are moderately correlated (Amiati, 2019). Table 10 shows the VIF for
multicollinearity and significance of independence variables versus ROA. The VIF for
corporate governance and financial reporting was 1.183. Since the VIF is above 1 it does
show that the variables are moderately correlated but it is not enough to be concerned
about.
Table 7.
Correlation Matrix of Corporate Governance and Financial reporting
ROA
FR

0.014

CG

0.088

Table 8.
ANOVA for independent variables (FR, CG) vs. dependent variable ROA

Model
1

Sum of Squares
Regression

df

Mean Square

.967

2

.484

Residual

116.240

317

.367

Total

117.207

319

F

Sig.
1.319

.269b
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Table 9.
Coefficients and significance of independent variables vs. ROA
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
1

B

Std. Error

(Constant)

.982

.136

CG

.001

.001

FR

-.060

.152

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta

Correlations
t

Sig.

Zero-order

7.231

.000

.098

1.603

.110

.088

-.024

-.393

.694

.014

Table 10.
VIF coefficients for multi-collinearity and significance of independent variables vs. ROA
Correlations
Model
1

Partial

Part

Tolerance

VIF

(Constant)
CG

.090

.090

.845

1.183

FR

-.022

-.022

.845

1.183

The test of the statistical hypothesis independent and dependent variables uses the
following formula:
H2.0: β1=β2=β3=β5=β=0
H2.A: Not all βi are zero
The R-value clarifies the variation in ROA, and the betas describe which
independent variables have explanatory power. The multiple regression analysis was
conducted using Minitab software. The multiple regression results and the model for
regression findings are included in Tables 7, 8, 9, and 10. The decision to reject the null
hypothesis that all the coefficients are zero and accept the alternative hypothesis.
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Therefore, there is no evidence to confirm the relationship between corporate
governance, financial reporting and ROA. A hypothesis test for the regression formula's
corporate governance would identify which of the coefficients are not zero. The
relationship between corporate governance, financial reporting and ROA is inconclusive.
Thus, I rejected the null hypothesis because there is not a significant relationship between
corporate governance, financial reporting, and profitability.
The lack of relationship between corporate governance, financial reporting and
ROA specifies that shareholders are not interested in corporate governance and financial
reporting. This lack of interest is likely due to a lack of proper coordination and
overlapping of responsibilities and duties, resulting in inefficiencies. Similarly, the lack
of relationship between corporate governance, financial reporting and ROA indicates that
shareholders do not like excessive ownership stakes in the hands of board members,
which reduces corporate financial performance.

ROE. Next, I checked the multicollinearity among the independent variables and
ROE the dependent variable using multiple regression between examining the
relationship between corporate governance, financial reporting, and dependent variable of
ROE. Table 6 presents the correlation of all the study explanatory variables for multiple
regression models for testing the multicollinearity among these variables. The tables 11,
12, 13, and 14 illustrates that multicollinearity was not a problem in this study. As per the
correlation matrix, in table 11the highest correlation between the two explanatory
variables is negative 13.1%. The second highest pairwise correlation between ROE and
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CG was a negative 7.1%. Table 12 looks at the p-value which shows .269. Since it is
above .05 it shows that there is not a significant relationship between the variables. Table
13 shows the significance of independent variables is .060 for model 1 constant and it
was too low to detect for the corporate governance and financial reporting. Table 14
shows the VIF which is 1.183. The value is above 1 slightly which shows a moderate
correlation between the variables. The correlation is not significant enough to worry
about.
Table 11.
Correlation Matrix of Corporate Governance and Financial reporting
ROE
FR
CG

-0.131
-0.071

Table 12.
ANOVA for independent variables (FR, CG) vs. dependent variable ROA

Model
1

Sum of Squares
Regression

df

Mean Square

.967

2

.484

Residual

116.240

317

.367

Total

117.207

319

F

Sig.
1.319

.269b
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Table 13.
Coefficients and significance of independent variables vs. ROE

Model
1
(Constant)
CG
FR

Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients
B
Std. Error
Beta
73.001
2
36.500
4066.428
317
12.828
4139.429
319

t
2.845

Correlations
Sig.
Zero-order
.060b
73.001
4066.428
4139.429

Table 114.
VIF coefficients for multi-collinearity and significance of independent variables vs. ROE
Model
1

Partial
(Constant)
CG
FR

Part
-.022
-.112

Correlations
Tolerance
-.021
-.112

VIF
.845
.845

1.183
1.183

The test of the statistical hypothesis independent and dependent variables uses the
following formula:
H3.0: β1=β2=β3=β5=β=0
H3.A: Not all βi are zero
The relationship between corporate governance, financial reporting and the dependent
variables were tested using multiple regression analysis. I conducted a multiple
regression analysis using Minitab.
NIM. Lastly, I checked the multicollinearity among the independent variables and
ROA the dependent variable using multiple regression between examining the
relationship between corporate governance, financial reporting, and dependent variable of
ROA. Tables 15, 16, 17, and 18 presents the correlation of all the study explanatory
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variables for multiple regression models for testing the multicollinearity among these
variables. The table illustrates that multicollinearity was not a problem in this study. As
per the correlation matrix, the highest correlation between the two explanatory variables
is negative .05%. The second highest pairwise correlation between NIM and CG was a
positive 7.5%. The test of the statistical hypothesis independent and dependent variables
uses the following formula:
H4.0: β1=β2=β3=β5=β=0.
H4.A: Not all βi are zero
I used multiple regression analyses to examine the relationship between the
market value measured by NIM and corporate governance. I conducted multiple linear
regression analysis using Minitab. However, the decision is to reject the null hypothesis
and accept the alternative hypothesis that all the slope coefficients are not zero.
Therefore, there is evidence to support a linear relationship between NIM and corporate
governance (see Table 15. 6). Table 16 shows the ANOVA which shows a significance of
.269. Since this is higher than the p-value of .05 it shows there is not a statistically
significant relationship. Table 17 shows the coefficients and significance of the variables.
The significance is .323 which is greater than .05 which signifies the relationship is not
significant. Table 18 shows the VIF for the variables. The VIF is 1.183 which signifies a
moderate correlation but the correlation is not significant enough to worry about.
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Table 15.
Correlation Matrix of Corporate Governance and Financial reporting
NIM
FR

-0.005

CG

0.075

Table 126.
ANOVA for independent variables (FR, CG) vs. dependent variable NIM
Model
1

Regression
Residual
Total

Sum of Squares
.967
116.240
117.207

df
2
317
319

Mean Square
.484
.367

F
1.319

Sig.
.269b

Table 137.
Coefficients and significance of independent variables vs. NIM

Model
1
(Constant)
CG
FR

Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients
B
Std. Error
Beta
1.470
2
.735
205.762
317
.649
207.232
319

t
1.133

Correlations
Sig.
Zero-order
.323b
1.470
205.762
207.232

Table 148.
VIF coefficients for multi-collinearity and significance of independent variables vs. NIM
Model
1

Partial
(Constant)
CG
FR

Part
.084
-.038

Correlations
Tolerance
.084
-.038

VIF
.845
.845

1.183
1.183
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Interpretation of Findings
This study aimed to investigate the relationship between corporate governance,
financial reporting, and profitability. To examine these relationships and answer the
research question, a theoretical framework is based on agency theory to create a
connection between corporate governance and financial reporting as independent
variables and measure corporate profitability as a dependent variable. Profitability was
measured by ROA, ROE, and NIM. I conducted a multiple regression to find linear
relationships profitability as dependent variables and corporate governance and financial
reporting as predictors. I used a correlation matrix of the predictors and VIF values to
check the correlation or multicollinearity problems among predictors. Multicollinearity
was not the issue in the multiple regression models. I also used R-value to clear up the
dependent variables' variation and identified the independent variables with explanatory
power. The discoveries of the study are presented below.

Corporate governance and corporate financial reporting. The study's research
question addressed the relationship between corporate governance, financial reporting,
and profitability in regional banks. The literature on corporate governance provided
controversial findings regarding the relationship between corporate governance, financial
reporting, and profitability (Greuning & Bratanovic, 2020). The multiple regression
analysis results identified a non-statistically significant relationship between ROA, ROE,
and NIM. The p values at 5% level of significance and adjusted R2 in Table 3, 4, and 5
and confirmed a positive relationship between the study predictors and ROA. However,
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the findings revealed that corporate governance and financial reporting did not have a
significant relationship with ROA. The p values and the adjusted R2 in Table 4 supported
a statistical relationship between corporate governance and financial reporting and
profitability measured by ROE.
The literature has not fully explored the relationship between corporate
governance mechanisms and financial performance. However, previous researchers found
a positive effect on the number of board members on committees on the disclosure and
transparency of accounting information (Bonna, 2011). I expected that the impact of
corporate governance and financial reporting would affect profitability. The regression
results in Table 6, Table 7, Table 11 and Table 15 identified an insignificant relationship
between corporate governance, and financial reporting, ROA, ROE, and NIM. The results
are consistent with previous studies on corporate governance and financial reporting and
how improper coordination of committees can negatively affect the financial performance
(Bonna, 2011).
The empirical research on the relationship between corporate governance,
financial reporting, and profitability found a mixed relationship between corporate
governance structure and financial performance. I expected banks with a more mature
corporate governance and financial reporting would improve profitability understanding.
Contrary to my expectation, the regression results in Table 6, Table 7, Table 11 and Table
15 provided an insignificant relationship between corporate governance maturity,
financial reporting and profitability measured by ROA, ROE, and NIM. The findings

87
indicate that investors do not care how mature the banks corporate governance and
financial reporting, which reduces bank performance.
The previous studies about the relationship between executive compensation and
corporate financial performance found a mixed relationship between executive
compensation and financial performance. Some researchers found that excessive
executive compensation could reduce financial performance; however, others found that
increasing executive compensation could directly improve bank performance (Liu et al.,
2020). I expected that the larger the executive compensation, the lower the corporate
financial performance measured by ROA, ROE, and NIM. Furthermore, the significant
positive relationship between executive compensation and financial reporting was not
expected. Hence, the regression results identified that the higher the executive
compensation could attract, retain, and motivate experienced executives, positively
affecting financial reporting.
In general, the relationships between all independent variables of corporate
governance and corporate financial reporting mechanisms and profitability measured by
ROA, ROE, and NIM were weak. The regression results of the relationships between
independent variables and financial performance indicated that the adjusted R2 was
below 30%. Hence, I excluded all insignificant variables from the regression models and
reconducted the multiple regression analysis to determine if the variance in the financial
performance explained by significant variables increased. The regression results showed
that no material change of the adjusted R2.
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In conclusion, the study’s findings revealed no significant relationships between
corporate governance and financial reporting and profitability measured ROA, ROE, and
NIM. Corporate governance did not affect ROA, ROE, and NIM. ROA and ROE had a
significant positive relationship. ROA also had a meaningful positive relationship with
NIM. ROA, ROE, and NIM all had significant positive relationships.

Corporate governance and profitability. The study research question focused
on the relationship between corporate governance, financial reporting, and profitability in
regional banks. The multiple regression results suggest that there was not a statistically
significant relationship between corporate governance and financial reporting and ROA,
ROE and NIM. The p values at 2.6% for ROA, 2.6% for ROE and 2.6% for NIM and
adjusted R2 in Table 8, 12 and 16 supported the evidence of no relationship between
corporate governance and NIM. The results supported the statistical evidence of a weak
relationship between ROA, ROE, and corporate governance because R2 is 4.84%. I found
that corporate governance and financial reporting did not have a significant relationship
with NIM. In the literature, most corporate governance scholars concluded that corporate
governance is an essential factor for the firm value. Most researchers found a significant
positive relationship between corporate governance and bank value. A few scholars found
a mixed relationship (Bebchuk & Hirst, 2019; Callahan & Soileau, 2017; Madhani,
2017).
The regression results supported statistical evidence of an insignificant
relationship between corporate governance, financial reporting and NIM. Some
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researchers found a positive relationship, whereas others found a negative relationship
between corporate governance, financial reporting and NIM. Some scholars identified
board independence as a corporate governance mechanism that increases NIM. Other
scholars identify board independence to control the CEO's power, which increases NIM.
Furthermore, other researchers believe that independent board members are more likely
to align their interests with management, which leads to an increase in NIM (Abdelbadie
& Salama, 2019). The study aligns with previous studies that identified no significant
relationship between corporate governance, financial reporting, and NIM.
In general, boards use committees to help corporate directors perform and
discharge their responsibilities and duties effectively. Hence, committees could help
improve the financial performance and NIM of a bank. The relationship between
committees and NIM has not been thoroughly studied; however, Bonna (2011) identified
a negative relationship between committees and NIM. The implication is that banks with
too many board committees may lead to inefficiency due to improper coordination. I
expected that the relationship between the board committees would be positive with
increased efficiency. The regression results identified statistical evidence of an
insignificant negative relationship between board committees and NIM. However, this
study's findings are consistent with the findings of Bonna (2011) that there is a negative
relationship between corporate governance, financial reporting, and NIM.
The agency theory agents recommend a higher overlap between stock ownership
and business management to mitigate interest conflicts. Mitigating the conflict of interest
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leads to better bank value (Seal, 2006). Therefore, I expected that higher ownership
among the board members increases the bank NIM. The regression results provided
statistical evidence of an insignificant relationship between ownership structure and NIM.
The previous studies produced mixed findings regarding the relationship between
corporate governance and NIM (Ajili & Bouri, 2018). The findings of this study are
inconsistent with agency theory regarding the ownership concentration by board
members. The results are still consistent with some previous research findings of the
relationship between ROA, ROE, and NIM.
In general, the relationship between all independent variables of corporate
governance, financial reporting, and NIM was weak. The regression results of the
relationship between the independent variables indicated that the adjusted R2 was below
20%. Therefore, I excluded all significance from the regression model and conducted the
multiple regression analysis to determine if NIM's variance explained the significant
independent variable. The regression results showed no material change to the adjusted
R2. In conclusion, the study’s findings revealed insignificant relationships between
corporate governance and NIM.
Applications to Professional Practice
This study's primary purpose was to increase the understanding of CEOs on the
importance of corporate governance for financial reporting and profitability in regional
banks. The study's findings were consistent with previous studies that identified a
significant relationship between financial reporting and profitability. Some previous

91
studies also showed that corporate governance had an insignificant, meaningful, and
adverse effect on financial reporting and profitability. The study also showed evidence
conflicting with the previous studies.
This study's findings may help CEOs know whether or not corporate governance
affects financial performance and profitability. Once bank CEOs understand the
relationship between corporate governance, financial reporting, and profitability, they
may be more apt to implement corporate governance and follow the rules and regulations.
Legislators may also capitalize on the results that identify corporate governance and how
they can enhance the state and country’s economic growth. The study provides critical
information for researchers, regulators, and investors to improve the return on
investments and financial performance while mitigating bank failures. The findings could
improve investor confidence in the banks’ performance while also reducing investment
risk.
Furthermore, the results can benefit shareholders by identifying banks that
implement and exercises corporate governance and financial reporting best practices.
Investors will efficiently and adequately allocate the invested funds to compliant banks,
resulting in higher ROA, ROE, and NIM. Banks that do not have acceptable corporate
governance and financial reporting practices will find difficulty in finding investors and
raising capital. Hence, corporate governance with the board of directors and executives
that comply with the best practices can mitigate interest conflicts between stakeholders.
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According to Bonna (2011), being compliant can help companies raise funds necessary
for operation and expansion.
Several studies identified corporate governance and financial reporting as a
crucial factor for the overall growth of bank performance and the country and state
economy. However, some of the research had mixed reviews on the relationship between
corporate governance, financial reporting, and profitability. Bank CEOs want additional
evidence of the relationships between the variables. Producing a connection between the
variables is the responsibility of the researcher. However, this study's results represent a
select value and benefit for bank CEOs and investors because this research looked at the
relationship between corporate governance, financial reporting, and profitability in
regional banks within the Midwest. The findings in this study can reduce investment risk
while also increasing investor confidence in regional bank performance.
Furthermore, the findings can help stakeholders invest in banks that adopt the best
corporate governance and financial reporting practices. The increase in investors can lead
to an increase in ROA, ROE, and NIM. Hence, any banks that do not have good
corporate governance and financial reporting would find it difficult to raise capital within
the stock markets and investors. As a result, boards of directors and executives must
comply with and adopt corporate governance practices. More investors could allow banks
to raise funds necessary to expand operations (Bonna, 2011).
Based on previous studies, corporate governance is crucial for banks' growth and
the local and state economies. However, some of the findings were mixed with the
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influence of bank performance, corporate governance, and financial reporting. Bank
CEOs do want more evidence as to the relationship between the three variables. This
study's findings represent an added value for CEOs and investors because this is one of
the few studies that examine the relationship between corporate governance, financial
reporting, and profitability in regional banks.
Implications for Social Change
Since there is no significant relationship between corporate governance, financial
reporting, and profitability, social change suggestions have become more reasonable and
more transparent. This lack of significance can still create a place for change within
society. Suppose the CEOs understand the importance for banks to adhere to corporate
governance guidelines. In that case, they can see an increase in investors and financial
performance; it could lead to a rise in corporate governance compliance.
Bank executives strive to increase the banks' financial performance, and investors
need to see the negative and positive relationship between experienced employees and an
increase in investors. Therefore, this study supports a need for compliance among CEOs
and corporate governance regulations. The banks that comply with corporate governance
rules and regulations significantly impact investors, customers, suppliers, employees, and
the community. Therefore, through this study, I urge bank executives, regulators,
investors, employees, and customers to work in unison to create a better society.
Bank leaders need to consider more than just the bank's commercial activities and
consider the benefits of the local communities and societies in which they operate. When
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bank executives change how they think, it can result in economic benefits and social
change such as better profits, higher investments, increased employee satisfaction, and
job security. Hence, compliance with corporate governance has several implications
beyond increased financial performance and profitability. Corporate governance
compliance can improve investors and the community's lives, leading to positive social
change. Therefore, this study's findings may contribute to positive social change by
encouraging bank executives to comply with corporate governance regulations.
In this study, there have been many benefits of corporate governance for both
society and business practices. Although the study's findings did not support the research
question, it can provide several services for the community, investors, employees, and
banks. The community's benefits are reducing corruption and embezzlement, which
reassures investors and increases investments—an increase in assets increases in
developing markets, which directly impacts the community's economic health. The
benefits for investors, employees, and banks include reducing the cost of capital while
improving the bank's financial and non-financial performance. Taking these steps will
also enhance the bank's reputation, positively impacting shareholders' values and
lowering the investment risk. From a broader perspective, implementing the information
and findings within this study could affect its financial stability. When banks are more
profitable, the government can see economic growth. Investors want companies that can
be sustainable. When banks are built with sound corporate governance and have a solid
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financial foundation, they provide a balance for investors between economic growth and
social support.
Recommendations for Action
This quantitative correlational study aimed to investigate the relationship between
corporate governance, financial reporting, and profitability in regional banks. The
recommendations for corporate governance varied by the scholar. Some suggested small
board sizes, increased board independence, board committees, board members to own
more stock, and increased executive compensation. On the other hand, shareholders and
legislatures encouraged larger-sized boards, fewer board committees, greater ownership
among board members, and decreased executive compensation. However, the findings
within the study conflicted with the assertions from scholars, shareholders, and
legislature.
The findings provided that there was not a correlation between board size with
financial reporting and profitability. Even though board size can be a crucial corporate
governance mechanism and could help mitigate agency problems, there was no direct
correlation between corporate governance and profitability. Greuning and Bratanovic
(2020) discussed the importance of the board of directors within the banking institutions.
The board of directors controls the strategic direction, management, and operational
policies and ensures the bank follows their regulations (Greuning & Bratanovic, 2020).
This study's findings showed the importance of the ROA, ROE, and NIM within the
banking institutions, but they did not directly correlate with corporate governance. I
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recommend that the banks ensure that their corporate governance and financial reporting
follows all rules and regulations to encourage more investors in the stock market. I
recommend that the bank's board of directors consists of at least eight members. The
majority of banks within this study had boards that consisted of at least eight members. A
larger size board can provide better supervision over management, accessibility to more
resources, and members with more experience. All of these items will lead to the better
financial health of a company.
This study's findings provided evidence that executives who receive an excessive
amount of compensation increase the bank's financial performance. However, there was
not any indication of the rise in compensation affecting the profitability of the banks. I
recommend that the banks use compensation incentives to reward executives and ensure
that they align with the stakeholders' interests. The incentives should consider levels of
benefits along with executive compensation to both financial performance and
profitability. Executive compensation should be based on its financial performance and
focus more on long-term performance than short-term performance.
The findings did not identify any relationship with ROE, ROA, and NIM, which
has not been the case in previous studies. Board independence is crucial to efficient and
effective control of executive compensation and bank performance. Banks with an
increase in board independence, show an increase in profitability. Board independence
also promises a more significant amount of integrity on the financial statements. An
increase in reliable financial statements reduces the number of bankruptcies and
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economic distress of banks. Furthermore, consistent with previous studies but differing to
the study’s findings, I recommend that stock markets encourage banks to hire a larger
portion of independent board members.
Bank board committees ensure that the executives perform in the best interests of
the shareholders. The number of committees each bank has did not have a direct
correlation with the bank's financial performance and profitability. Based on the literature
review and experience, I recommend that each bank's number of committees is limited to
three. The committees should be reduced to the three most significant committees:
executive committee, nomination, remuneration committee, and audit committee. Each
bank should have its corporate governance that identifies each committee's
responsibilities to avoid duplication of duties, leading to more efficient decisions. The
duties of each committee should be expanded to include any related areas. For instance,
the executive committee can also perform capital investment functions and strategic
planning. Each committee should have at least one member with experience within their
related areas.
The last recommendation would be that regulators set strict penalties for noncompliance with corporate governance. The sentences should be imposed not only on the
bank but also on the executives and board members for non-compliance. Since there is a
massive demand for corporate governance, it is essential to define corporate governance.
Having one definition for corporate governance will encourage and enforce banks to
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make decisions in the shareholders' best interests. Using one purpose will also help
balance the power between banks and stakeholders.
The parties that should pay attention and capitalize on this study's findings
include academic researchers, regulatory bodies, business leaders, the board of directors,
CEOs, CFOs, financial analysts, and experts in the area of corporate governance,
financial reporting, and banking. I will disseminate this study's results through finance
and accounting periodicals, professional conferences, including informational meetings
within the community forums and decision-makers. I will also publish the entire study in
the ProQuest/UMI dissertation database.
Recommendations for Further Research
This research is a few studies investigating the relationship between corporate
governance, financial reporting, and profitability in regional banks within the Midwest.
As discussed in previous sections, such as Applications to Professional Practice and
Recommendations for Action sections, this study's findings conflicted with some earlier
studies while being consistent with others. This study, however, did have some
limitations which can be avoided in future studies.
The study used the available secondary data instead of primary data. Future
studies could collect preliminary data through interviews and surveys, which would allow
them to make the necessary adjustments or calculations on the corporate financial reports.
The adjustments or recalculations of corporate financial information to standardized
accounting practices may result in different financial statements components leading to
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different results. This study used ROA, ROE, and NIM, accounting measures for
measuring financial performance and profitability. Scholars disagree on the specific steps
to assess financial performance and profitability, such as economic value added, equity
prices, and market value-added. These measures can change the research findings.
The focus of this study was on the internal processes of the company instead of
external factors. External factors, however, can play a significant part in the financial
performance of a bank. Some of these factors include interest rate policy, macroeconomy,
inflation, micro-economy, and other factors all can have a significant impact on financial
performance and profitability. Future studies can use external factors instead of internal
factors to investigate financial performance and profitability.
I used three corporate governance and financial reporting mechanisms, such as (a)
mature program, (b) new program, (c), and no program. Future studies can use different
corporate governance and financial reporting mechanisms such as executive
compensation, board size, ownership structure, leverage, voting rights, dividend policies,
takeover policies, and board members. Most of these corporate governance mechanisms
were not used in previous research or literature. Using different corporate governance and
financial reporting mechanisms can provide different results.
Reflections
I work as an accounting instructor at a local community college. As a practitioner
in the corporate governance and financial reporting field, I examined the relationship
between corporate governance, financial reporting, and profitability with the
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preconceived notion that corporate governance and financial reporting mechanisms
significantly impact profitability. I used secondary data in the current study; therefore,
my previous belief did not influence the findings. This study's findings revealed that
corporate governance and financial reporting does not play a significant role in financial
performance.
Moreover, I discovered that corporate governance really has no effect on the
bank’s profitability. The results did show that too much corporate governance can lead to
an inefficient organization. The inefficiency can be attributed to the large number of tasks
they undertake. For instance, they have several individual subcommittees, stakeholder
interests, management requests, and state and federal regulations. As a result, this leads to
limited responses for customer needs. In order to be effective, the banks need to rely on
their customer service representatives and focus on financial performance instead of
corporate governance.
In this study, no human participants were involved; thereby, the researcher had no
possible effects on the participants. The DBA journey helped me gain new insight and
experience of different processes and techniques in this study. This study's findings
helped me understand the importance of the relationship between corporate governance
and financial reporting and profitability. Furthermore, the findings of this study
motivated me. They created an interest in conducting further research in corporate
governance and considering different mechanisms and statistical techniques to improve
bank performance and the environment.
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Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to identify if there was a significant relationship
between corporate governance, financial reporting and profitability in 80 regional banks
in the Midwest for the period 2015–2018. The independent variables were (a) mature
program, (b) new program, (c) and no program, while the dependent variables were (a)
ROA, (b) ROE, (c), and NIM. Standard multiple regression was used to test those
relationships.
The findings identified that corporate governance and financial reporting does not
have a significant role in the bank's profitability. The results did indicate that ROE, ROA,
and NIM have a significant role. When one increases, so does the other one. However,
these findings showed that corporate governance and financial reporting do not directly
affect the profitability of the bank. The greater the ROA was then, the more significant
the ROE. The greater the NIM, the greater the ROE and ROA.
In conclusion, the study findings concerning the relationship between corporate
governance mechanisms, financial reporting, and profitability were divided into three
groups: (a) the significant relationships, (b) the damaging relationships, and (c) the nonsignificant relationships. There were no corporate governance mechanisms for the first
group that had a significant relationship with ROA, ROE, and NIM. For the second group
related to negative relationships, corporate governance and financial reporting did not
have a negative relationship with ROA, ROE, and NIM. For the third group, corporate
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governance and financial reporting had an insignificant relationship with ROE, ROA, and
NIM.
Based on the literature review presented in Section 1 and the findings of this
study, my recommendations are (a) publicly listed banks should increase the number of
their board of directors to at least eight members, (b) banks should use long-term
compensation incentives to reward corporate executives and to align the banks' interests
with the shareholders financially, (c) regulators should pass a law enforcing companies to
hire a larger portion of independent board members to monitor the banks' activities, and
(d) regulators should set forth harsh penalties for banks' and bank executives for noncompliance to corporate governance and financial reporting. Implementing these
recommendations can improve the banks' financial performance and profitability, which
will also create a positive change and increase investor confidence. In return, this would
enhance the wealth of the investors and the economy. The results indicate a necessity for
future studies in corporate governance using primary data instead of secondary data,
external factors instead of internal factors, and different corporate governance
mechanisms.
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Appendix A: G*Power Sample Size Determination
Determine Sample Size

Confidence Level:

95%

Confidence Interval:

5

Population:

100

Sample size needed:

80

99%

